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ARTICLES
Difficult Times in Kentucky
Corrections-Aftershocks
of a "Tough on Crime" Philosophy
BY ROBERT G. LAWSON*
INTRODUCTION
T wo sets of recent events, one that was open to public view and one
that was carefully concealed from the public, dramatically portray
the difficult times that prevail in Kentucky's corrections system,
although in very different ways. The first set of events began near the
end of 2002 with Governor Patton issuing an executive order that
commuted the sentences of 567 convicted felons and ordered their
immediate release from state custody,' a move made necessary according
to Governor Patton as part of "continuing efforts to manage the financial
woes of the state."2 The Governor was operating the state at the time on a
spending plan rather than a budget (because the legislature had failed to
enact a budget bill for 2002) and perhaps was acting to draw attention to
the legislature's failure to perform its constitutional responsibility to pass
a budget. Needless to say, his acknowledgement that the state had more
inmates than it could afford to imprison achieved his objective and more.
Word that Kentucky was releasing convicted felons early attracted
attention far and wide, but it attracted more than just attention inside the
state's boundary lines. Law enforcement officials described the
*Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law.
Exec. Order No. 2002-1379, Paul E. Patton, Governor, Commonwealth of
Kentucky (Dec. 16, 2002).
2 Press Release, Ky. Dep't of Corr., Governor Patton Orders the Early Release of
Non-Violent Offenders to Offset Budget Shortfalls for the Department of Corrections
(Dec. 16, 2002).
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Governor's early release program as a "get-out-of-jail-free card" 3 and
took steps to let the public know that they were "miffed that [the
Governor] ha[d] 'undercut' their work."
4
Undaunted by this reaction, the Governor duplicated his decision
within a few weeks and commuted the sentences of 328 additional
convicted felons, 5 describing his release order on this occasion as "a very
difficult decision.., that is absolutely necessary as a part of the solution
to Kentucky's severe fiscal revenue shortfall."6 The reaction this time
was louder, harsher, and more critical of the Governor. Prosecutors
accused him of putting citizens at risk and of playing politics with the
public's safety,7 editorial writers described his actions as "ill-fated ' 8 and
"a colossal political blunder," 9 and the Attorney General tried without
success to challenge his authority in court, describing "the early
release . . . [as] 'an immediate and irresponsible danger' to the public."'1
But when the fury died down and the dust settled over these events, the
early release program had done nothing in one respect and much in
another. Because the early releases were not in fact very early," the
program did almost nothing to reduce the mass of humanity in the state's
incarceration facilities and provided no lasting relief from the budget
problems that triggered it in the first place. On the other hand, the
program cast some badly needed light on problems in the state's
corrections system and for the first time in a long while aroused some
public interest in the state's heavy, if not insatiable, appetite for
incarcerating its citizens.
Overlapping this set of recent events involving the early release of
convicted felons was a second set of events that spoke almost as
3 See Louise Taylor, Inmates Get Early Release: Money-Saving Measure Miffs
Prosecutors, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Dec. 19, 2002, at Al (quoting Fayette
County Commonwealth's Attorney Ray Larson).
4 id.
5 See Exec. Order No. 2003-37, Paul E. Patton, Governor, Commonwealth of
Kentucky (Jan. 14, 2003).
6 Press Release, Ky. Dep't of Corr., Governor Patton Orders Second Early Release
of Non-Violent Offenders to Offset Budget Shortfalls for the Department of Corrections
(Jan. 14, 2003).
7 See Governor Halts Early Releases; Warns They Could Resume, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 1, 2003, at Al (quoting prosecutors from several counties).
8 Larry Keeling, No State Tax Increases? See Latest Tuition Hikes, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 23, 2003, at Dl.
9 Editorial, Crime and Punishment, KY. POST, Mar. 22, 2003, at K4.
10 Tom Loftus, Hearing Set on Release of Prisoners, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville), Jan. 18, 2003, at 1B (quoting former Kentucky Attorney General Ben
Chandler).
11 The inmates covered by the first commutation order were released an average of
80 days early, while those covered by the second order were released an average of 136
days early. See Press Releases, supra notes 2 and 6.
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forcefully about the magnitude of problems for Kentucky corrections,
although this time not so dramatically and not under the watchful eye of
an interested public. At the center was a Kentucky statute providing that
"[t]he period of time spent on parole shall not count as a part of the
prisoner's maximum sentence" if the inmate is returned to prison for
violation of parole.' 2 Not even inmates could complain with a straight
face about the fairness and common sense of the position expressed in
this law. Nonetheless, in 2002 (before the early release program
described above) a bill was introduced in the legislature to amend the
statute to require full credit on prison terms for time spent on parole by
inmates returned to prison for parole violations not involving new felony
convictions.' 3 The bill went to the Senate Judiciary Committee, was
given minimal and probably indifferent consideration, and then died on
the legislative vine without as much as a committee vote. The thought of
equating time on parole with time in prison in calculating completion of
sentences proved to be too much to swallow in a "tough on crime"
environment, even with full prison facilities and a budget crisis on the
horizon. 14 At least, it was too much to swallow under the watchful eye of
law enforcement officials and the general public.
The legislature opened its 2003 session with its members' attention
focused primarily on the state's budget crunch. The inmate population
problem in corrections was on the legislative radar screen because of the
early release program, and it was on the public's mind for the same
reason. 15 No bill was ever introduced to resurrect the idea of equating
time on parole with time in prison in calculating sentences, and no entry
on the subject can be found in the action ledgers of those committees that
could be expected to discuss and debate such an idea. Nonetheless, there
emerged from the session a prison-sentence-calculation law identical to
the bill that had died in the 2002 session:
Notwithstanding KRS 439.344, the period of time spent on parole shall
count as a part of the prisoner's remaining unexpired sentence.., when
12 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 439.344 (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
'" S. 173, 2002 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2002).
14 The impact of this initiative on prison numbers promised to be substantial and
lasting since many parolees are returned to prison for completion of their sentences, and
about two-thirds of them are returned for parole violations that do not involve new felony
convictions. See Ky. Dep't of Corr., Recidivism 1999-2000, 11 (2000) (unpublished, on
file with author) [hereinafter Dep't of Corr., Recidivism].
15 See Governor Halts Early Releases, supra note 7. Critics wanted to cast doubt on
the wisdom of the Governor's actions and found opportunity to do so early. "In two
noteworthy instances in Western Kentucky, one [former] inmate was arrested and
charged with robbing several banks, while another [former] inmate ... was charged with
a rape that allegedly occurred ... three days after he was released." Id.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
a parolee is returned as a parole violator for a violation other than a
new felony conviction. 16
The law came into existence without identifiable sponsors or
supporters and without any open discussion or debate, buried away as a
"special provision" in a budget bill that consisted of hundreds of pages in
the session's enacted legislation.17 As a part of the budget bill, it makes
no permanent change in the sentencing laws, will have no effect at the
end of the budget period unless reenacted into law in some other form,
and for these reasons alone looks almost like a desperate, certainly a
feeble, attempt to address the serious population problems of the state's
prison system. The fact that it came into existence as it did, out of the
deep shadows of the General Assembly, suggests that there is enormous
political risk in any action that appears to show softness toward crime,
while the fact that it came into existence at all suggests that there are at
least some people, most likely the professionals in the corrections
department, who fully understand the magnitude and seriousness of the
population problem in the prison system.
The inmate population problem disclosed or suggested by these two
sets of events is not unique to Kentucky. The thirst for incarceration of
citizens has reached levels far beyond anything ever experienced in this
country's history and seems to exist unchecked in almost every comer of
the nation. In its annual report of crime statistics in 2003, the United
States Department of Justice reported that in 2002 the inmate population
in federal and state prisons and jails reached and exceeded the two-
million mark for the first time.' In light of this astounding statistic, it is
no surprise that the country also has an astounding number of citizens on
probation and parole: "On any given day, more than 5 million people are
under the supervision of the correctional system . . . .This constitutes
nearly 3 percent of the total [adult] resident population, a rate of state
supervision that is unprecedented in U.S. history."' 9 When the two
populations are combined (incarcerated and supervised), the country's
corrections systems have custody or control over approximately seven
million people.
The huge appetite for incarceration of citizens reflected in these
numbers is a relatively new development for America, shown by the fact
that just thirty years ago the country's inmate population stood at less
16 2003 Ky. Acts ch. 156, § 36(a), at 1876.
17 See id. at 1723-1912.
18 See Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2002, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT. BULL. 1 (July 2003).
19 Marie Gottschalk, Black Flower: Prisons and the Future of Incarceration, 582
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 195, 197 (July 2002).
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than 330,000.20 The thought that the country holds more than two million
citizens in custody is disquieting on its own, but is much worse than
disquieting when put in a proper historical and comparative context:
From the mid-1920s to the early 1970s, the incarceration rate in the
United States was remarkably stable, averaging 110 state and federal
prisoners per 100,000 people. While the U.S. rate tended to be higher, it
did not radically exceed the incarceration rates of other advanced
industrialized countries. Since the early 1970s, the U.S. rate of
imprisonment has accelerated dramatically, resulting in a fivefold
increase in the incarcerated population between 1973 and 1997. Today,
the rate of incarceration in prison is 478 per 100,000. If jailed inmates
are included, the rate jumps to 699 per 100,000, which is six to ten
times the rate of the Western European countries. This constitutes a
higher proportion of the adult population than any other country in the
world except Russia. The United States, with 5 percent of the world's
population, has 25 percent of its prisoners. Even after taking into
account important qualifications in use of the standard 100,000
yardstick to compare incarceration rates cross-nationally, the United
States remains off the charts.
21
The most salient points of this statement should be underscored-
America has increased its incarceration rate 500% in twenty-five years,
it has 5% of the world's population but 25% of its prisoners, and it
competes only with Russia for world leadership in putting people in
prisons and jails. No one defends these results by arguing that America
has more lawlessness than other parts of the world, and no one argues
that America has made great progress in controlling crime by filling
prisons and jails to the brim and beyond, leaving open the not-so-remote
possibility that the country has lost sight of the enormous pain of
imprisonment and the fact that along with its two million inmates, it also
holds in custody two million real people.
For the first time in twenty-five years, driven to some extent by the
troubling facts and figures set out above and perhaps to a greater extent
by harsh economic conditions in state budgets, law and policy makers
have begun to manifest some serious concern over the masses of
humanity in the prison systems and to question the soundness of tough-
on-crime policies that work to overload a corrections system that is
already bulging at every seam.22 There is a scent of reform in the air, and
20 See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 19-20 (1999).
21 Gottschalk, supra note 19, at 197 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
22 For example, in February 2003 the National Conference of State Legislatures
organized a meeting of state legislators from around the country that were responsible for
criminal justice matters in their own states for a roundtable discussion on how to deal
with corrections issues (especially those affecting the operation of prisons) in a period of
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thus an opportunity for an enlightened debate over whether this country
is well-served by laws and policies that fill to capacity all the prisons
and jails the nation can build in pursuit of a belief that harsh punishment
and long prison sentences are indispensable to public order and public
safety. It remains to be seen whether this concern will vanish along with
state budget shortfalls, whether it will lead to meaningful and far-sighted
reform or to ill-advised, feeble, quick fixes like the one that made its
way into Kentucky's 2003 budget bill, and whether lawmakers can and
will run the political risk of reversing the nation's massive expansion of
its reliance on incarceration in favor of less punitive and less intrusive
forms of punishment. In the meantime, we need to better understand
where we are since we began embracing a tougher approach to crime
control, how we might have diminished the quality of criminal justice in
this country and in our state, and where we may be headed without a
significant change of direction in our course. All of this bears on the
focus, objective, and content of this article.
The objective of this article is to cast some light on corrections-
system problems brought on by elevated (and possibly unnecessary)
levels of incarceration, and especially on problems that trouble the
Kentucky corrections system and threaten to undermine the effectiveness
of the state's justice system. Part II describes how the country came to
embrace sentencing policies and practices capable of producing "a penal
system of a severity unmatched in the Western world., 23 Part III
describes Kentucky's embrace of equally harsh sentencing policies and
practices and the inmate population explosion that has occurred as a
direct result of those policies and practices. In Part III, attention is also
given to the huge costs associated with Kentucky's tough-on-crime
movement. Part IV is devoted to an identification of particular laws and
practices that have contributed most significantly to the astonishing
growth in Kentucky's incarcerated population over the last quarter
century. Part V examines some trends and projections in the prison
population in order to draw some attention to the most serious problems
that lie ahead if the state chooses to maintain its present course.
budget shortfalls. See ROBIN CAMPBELL, DOLLARS & SENTENCES: LEGISLATORS' VIEWS
ON PRISONS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE BUDGET CRIsis 3 (Vera Inst. of Justice 2003); see
generally DANIEL WILHELM & NICHOLAS R. TURNER, IS THE BUDGET CRISIS CHANGING
THE WAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND INCARCERATION? 1 (Vera Inst. of Justice 2002)
(suggesting the need for sentencing commissions to address the issue of fiscal resource
management); Michael M. O'Hear, The New Politics of Sentencing, 15 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 3 (2002) (discussing changes in the politics of sentencing).23 MICHAEL ToNRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 24 (1996).
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II. THE ROAD TO HARSHER PUNISHMENTS
A. Introduction
America's decision to wage war on crime through heavier
incarceration of its citizens has no specific birth date, although many if
not most authorities would agree that philosophical change with regard to
incarceration had begun to rear its head by the mid-1970s, just as the
state of Kentucky prepared to embark upon a new endeavor of its own
involving the justice system. The Kentucky General Assembly undertook
a major reform of the state's criminal laws during the late 1960s and
early 1970S,24 completed that effort in 1974,25 and gave the state a
26modem penal code that took effect on the first day of 1975.
The concurrence of these two events-the beginning of a "tough-
on-crime" era in the country and the nearly simultaneous adoption of a
new comprehensive penal code for Kentucky-makes the Kentucky
situation an especially suitable one for an examination of the inmate
population explosion and its effects upon the justice system. The new
code arose during an era not dominated by the belief that crime can and
should be controlled by infliction of harsh punishment, and in most
respects it duplicated the sentencing policies and practices that prevailed
in most of America ahead of the tough-on-crime era. It provides a good
benchmark for assessing policies and practices dominated by subsequent
harsher beliefs, especially when looking for specific causes for an inmate
population that has grown by nearly 600% since the new code was
adopted. In its heyday, this benchmark was called the rehabilitative
model of sentencing.
B. The Rehabilitative Model
Rehabilitation of offenders is only one of four goals that criminal law
scholars and philosophers have used as justification for inflicting
punishment (including imprisonment) on citizens:
24 In 1968, the General Assembly directed the Kentucky Crime Commission and the
Legislative Research Commission to prepare comprehensive recommendations for reform
of the state's criminal laws. See 1968 Ky. Acts eh. 230, at 895-96 (1968). In 1971, these
two agencies completed their work and published a recommended new penal code for
Kentucky. See KY. CRIME COvM'N & LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, KENTUCKY
PENAL CODE: FINAL DRAFT (1971) [hereinafter PENAL CODE: FINAL DRAFT]. In 1972, the
General Assembly enacted this recommendation into law and gave the enactment a
deferred effective date of July 1, 1974, intending to revisit the new legislation during the
1974 legislative session. See 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 385, at 1653.
25 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406.
26 See K.R.S. §§ 500-534 (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
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Four major goals are usually attributed to the sentencing process:
retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. Retribution
refers to just deserts; people who do certain things deserve to be
punished.... Deterrence emphasizes the onerous-ness of punishment;
offenders will be deterred from committing crimes because of a rational
calculation that the costs of punishment are too great.... Incapacitation
deprives a person of the capacity to commit crimes because they are
physically detained in prison; when offenders are in prison they cannot
commit crimes in the community. Rehabilitation is directed toward
changing offenders so they will not continue to commit crime in the
future.
2 7
No one could claim that rehabilitation ever served as the exclusive
goal of sentencing and punishment; however, no one could reasonably
dispute its predominance during a lengthy period of American history.
As one leading authority has stated, "[t]he twentieth century began with
the confident march of rehabilitative trumpets,"2 and "[r]ehabilitation
remained the central professed goal of American criminal justice ...
until the final quarter of the twentieth century.,
29
The sentencing model that developed during this period varied
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but had far more common
than uncommon components. The most prominent and influential
formulation of the model occurred with the adoption of the Model Penal
Code in 1962.30 In its most general provision about punishment, the
Model Code identified "crime prevention" as the first and broadest of
several purposes for sentencing of offenders31 and said that this purpose
was flexible enough to serve the traditional goals of deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.32 In addition, the Code indicates that
its specific provisions on sentencing were designed "to promote the
correction and rehabilitation of offenders." 33 Then, in its specific
provisions on sentencing, the Code recommended all of the essential
components of a rehabilitation model-penalty ranges for most crimes,
27 DoRIs L. MAcKENZIE, SENTENCING AND CoRRECTIoNs IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE I (Nat'l Inst. of Justice 2000).
28 Albert Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. CH. L. REv.
1, 1(2003).2 9 Id. at 6.
30 MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
31 See id. § 1.02(2)(a).
32 "[P]enal sanctions may advance preventive ends in different ways-by fortifying
normal instincts to refrain from injurious behavior, by deterrence both general and
special, by incapacitating persons who are dangerously disposed to engage in criminal
conduct, and by correcting those who manifest such antisocial disposition." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.02 cmt. 3(a) (1985).
" Id. § 1.02(2)(b).
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indeterminate sentencing for serious offenses, individualization of
punishment (i.e., fitting the punishment to the offender rather than the
offense), broad discretion placed in the hands of sentencing authorities,
and heavy use of parole for determining the actual lengths of
incarceration.34 More importantly perhaps, it recommended provisions
that favored probation and parole over incarceration, and in its
commentary spoke very strongly against excessive reliance on
imprisonment in efforts to control criminal conduct:
The Code accords a substantial priority to sentences that do not
involve imprisonment. There is no offense as to which imprisonment is
absolutely required . . . When the court is deciding between
imprisonment and withholding imprisonment, it is to choose against
imprisonment unless one of the specified grounds justifying
imprisonment is found. A sentence not involving imprisonment avoids
the poor associations and uselessness that confinement brings; and it
can convey the community's confidence that an offender can live
responsibly and give him a special incentive to do so. If the offender is
imprisoned, the parole board is directed to release him when he is
eligible for parole unless one of the specified reasons for further
confinement is thought to obtain.
35
In this regard, and in most others involving sentencing, the Model
Code was more reflective of the rehabilitative perspective of its time than
it was innovative. It contained barriers to an excessive reliance on
incarceration, encouraged and promoted the use of lesser rather than
greater punishments, and supplied no fuel for a population explosion in
the country's corrections systems. It could not have produced
incarceration rates beyond anything ever seen before without a
substantial modification of philosophy and substance.
14 See id. arts. 6-7. "[C]onsiderable latitude to determine sentences in individual
cases is left to the courts and to parole authorities. As far as major sentences to
imprisonment are concerned, the Code affords considerable judicial discretion and
accepts the desirability of substantial indeterminacy in the length of sentence actually to
be served. One underlying assumption of this approach is that no legislative definition
and grading of substantive offenses can capture all the factors that are relevant to an
appropriate sentence and that, in the language of Section 1.02(2)(e), offenders should be
differentiated 'with a view to a just individualization in their treatment.' A second
underlying assumption is that only up to a point can this differentiation be carried out at
the time of sentencing, that the proper length of imprisonment depends considerably on
an offender's response to conditions of imprisonment and on his perceived capacity to
refrain from criminal acts at the time he is to be released." Id. arts. 6 & 7 introductory
cmt. at 4.
" Id. at 8-9.
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C "A Perfect Storm"
Perhaps even before the ink was dry on the final draft of the Model
Code, seeds for a much tougher attitude toward crime had been planted
and conditions necessary for a radical change in the direction of the
justice system were, barely beyond the horizon. At least some, maybe
much, of the impetus for this change is traceable to the tumultuous and
troubled times of the 1960s. There was war abroad, disobedience at
home, and aggressive group and individual misbehavior never before
seen in America. This misbehavior was delivered daily, in disturbing
doses, to living rooms and workplaces across the country:
This decade [the 1960s] was a period of increasing crime, youthful
experimentation with drugs, police repression of civil rights
demonstrators, draft-card and flag burning, Stokely Carmichael, Jane
Fonda, the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and
Martin Luther King, Jr., Black Panthers, Richard Speck ... sexual
liberation, the Chicago Eight, and the Warren Court's due process
revolution. 3
6
Violence in the streets, burning and looting in inner cities, and
rioting in a major prison system combined with some of the tragic events
described above to create a much greater public fear of crime, increased
doubts about the effectiveness of the justice system, and a very intense
resentment of criminals. By the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the
1970s, the public was in the mood for an elevated war on crime and for a
"law and order" strategy that would seek to restore social order by
inflicting substantially harsher punishments on offenders. These events
set the stage for "a perfect storm," an unusual combination of events and
forces that would produce a very abrupt change of direction in the
criminal justice system, one that would seem in hindsight to have come
to pass "almost in an instant.,
37
In the early 1970s, a highly respected jurist questioned the fairness of
the rehabilitative model in a widely distributed publication 3' at about the
same time that a group of respected social science scholars were raising
doubts about the effectiveness of rehabilitation efforts.39 Critics of
36 Alschuler, supra note 28, at 13.3 71d. at9.
38 See MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrHOUT ORDER (1973).
39 See, e.g., Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PuB. INT. 22, 25 (1974) ("With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative
efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."); D.
LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF
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existing policies and practices seized the moment. Some "argued that
judicial discretion [in sentencing] leads to widespread disparity and
arbitrariness in individual sentences [and that] discretion in parole boards
to determine date of release is similarly productive of injustice."'4° Others
argued that "[r]ehabilitation, tested empirically, is a failure; nothing
works as a prison reform program to reduce recidivism,"'4' while still
others argued that parole boards "are unable to assess the benefits of
corrections programs to individual offenders and unable to predict the
likelihood that an offender will commit further crimes.' '42 Although some
would later retreat from earlier views and positions, 43 the critics at least
provided further fuel for an environment that had already been inflamed
by the public's fear of crime and its elevated level of resentment of
criminals.
Then there arrived on the scene, still in the 1970s, a coalition of
forces favoring sentencing reform that virtually guaranteed a radical
change of direction in the justice system. Law and policy makers at both
ends of the political and social spectrum (the "hawks and the doves of
the criminal process") 44 moved concurrently, if not jointly, against the
rehabilitation sentencing model, although pushed in that direction by
vastly different motives. Conservatives believed that rehabilitation was a
fantasy and a failure and that the sentencing system merely coddled the
criminal elements of society; they raved about and railed against
sentencing discretion, indeterminacy, and alternatives to tough
punishment. Liberals brought to the coalition concerns about fairness
TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES ch. 8 (1975) (summarizing treatment outcomes of
rehabilitative efforts).
40 MODEL PENAL CODE arts. 6 & 7 introductory cmt. at 11-12 (1985).
41 Leonard Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the
Demise of Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29, 33 (1970); see also Martinson, supra
note 39, at 25.
42 MODEL PENAL CODE arts. 6 & 7 introductory cmt. at 12 (1985); see also Peter B.
Hoffman & Michael A. Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity,
Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L.REv. 89, 91 (1978) ("After
several decades of research .. .empirical evidence generally fails to demonstrate that
institutional rehabilitative programs are effective or that the 'optimum time' for release
can be ascertained.").
43 For example, the social scientist who had presented the most influential criticism
of the effectiveness of rehabilitation later retracted his position on the basis of further
study: "And, contrary to my previous position, some treatment programs do have an
appreciable effect on recidivism." Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note
of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 244 (1979). In
addition, a noted legal scholar who had argued for abandonment of the rehabilitative
model later had a change of heart and adopted a different position: "As a former critic of
indeterminacy, I must now express my serious reservations about the abandonment of
rehabilitation." Orland, supra note 41, at 34 (footnote omitted).
44 Alschuler, supra note 28, at 9.
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and, in particular, about the sentencing disparities that flow naturally and
unavoidably from punishments that are made to fit offenders rather than
offenses; they often criticized the rehabilitation model more vehemently
and more pervasively than did the conservatives, as illustrated by the
following statement from Senator Edward Kennedy in opening a 1978
symposium on sentencing reform:
Sentencing in America today is a national scandal. Every day our
system of sentencing breeds massive injustice. Judges are free to roam
at will, dispensing ad hoc justice in ways that defy both reason and
fairness. Different judges mete out widely differing sentences to similar
offenders convicted of similar crimes.
4 5
Although not without some fear that sentencing reform might
ultimately lead to harsher punishment of defendants,4 6 liberals joined
conservatives in an assault upon the existing system and thereby left the
rehabilitative model without defenders. By the early 1980s, most law and
policy makers had abandoned rehabilitation as the predominant
justification for punishment; the rehabilitative sentencing model
described above was dead or dying in most jurisdictions.4 7 What was to
emerge as a replacement model was yet to be settled, although conditions
were ripe for a very sharp turn toward sentencing policies and practices
far more compatible with the "get tough" agenda of the conservatives
than with the "fairness" agenda of the liberals.
D. "Just Deserts" and "Punitive Penology "
The coalition for abandonment of the rehabilitative model never
converted into a coalition for a replacement model. Public opinion
continued to move further to the right concerning crime and criminals,
and sentencing policies and practices quickly followed, especially after
candidates for public office began to discover that "law and order" was
an unbeatable political strategy. Scholars formulated a new sentencing
45 Edward M. Kennedy, Symposium on Sentencing, Part I, Introduction, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 1, 1 (1978).
46 See id. at 4 ("The issue is not whether more offenders should be sentenced to
prison (they should not).").
47 The most visible rejection of the rehabilitation model occurred when Congress
enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988, (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3621-3625, 3742 (1988)). In this legislation, Congress
created the Federal Sentencing Commission and laid the groundwork for elimination of
judicial discretion in federal sentencing, indeterminate sentences, and the use of a parole
board for determining release.
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philosophy that was called "just deserts," which relied mostly on the idea
of retribution as justification for punishment:
There are four commonly accepted goals of criminal punishment:
Retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation/isolation.
However, only retributivism contains a valid philosophical premise
upon which a coherent, organized system of just punishment can be
built: It is the sole penal rationale concerned exclusively with doing
justice. A retributive punishment scheme is not inherently incompatible
with other enumerated penal goals. Indeed, any incidental deterrent,
rehabilitative, or preventive effects which result from just punishment
are certainly welcome. However, these additional social-utilitarian
goals cannot morally justify the imposition of criminal sanctions.48
The theory of "just deserts" was that "an offender should receive in
punishment as much as, and no more than he deserves., 49 Punishment
would be linked primarily to the severity of the offense so that "two
offenders who commit the same offense and have similar criminal
records [would] deserve [and get] the same penalty. 5 ° Punishment
would be fixed mostly by the law (not a judge exercising sentencing
discretion), would be certain at the outset (determinate rather than
indeterminate sentencing), and would be exacted in full from the
offender (no parole). The shift in sentencing philosophy needed to
embrace the new approach was monumental; "the new code word was
'just desert,' rather than the . . . discredited terms 'punishment,'
'vengeance,' or 'retribution,' 51 but the focus of the new philosophy and
approach was clearly and unmistakably on punishment for the sake of
punishment.
The influence of the "just deserts" philosophy is very difficult to
measure even with the benefit of hindsight. It was occasionally embraced
explicitly and in pure form, as in California: "The Legislature finds and
declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment. 5 2
Most of its principles are found in the federal Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (minimal judicial discretion, determinate sentences, no release by
parole, and almost no room for alternatives to incarceration),5 3
undoubtedly the most prominent sentencing reform of modem times. But
48 Robert A. Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 381 (1979).
49 MODEL PENAL CODE arts. 6 & 7 introductory cmt. at 13 (1985).
50 ToNRY, SENTENCING MATTERS, supra note 23, at 19.
51 Orland, supra note 41, at 33.
52 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 1985).
13 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3621-
3625, 3742 (1988)).
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neither this approach nor any other ever commanded the kind of support
that had earlier been accorded to the rehabilitation model, 4 the end result
of which was reform without the benefit of direction, consistency,
coherence, or purpose:
If a group of corrections officials, judges, and academics from the mid-
1950s were brought by time machine to our time, they would likely be
astonished by the seeming confusions, complexities, and
inconsistencies of policies and practices. They would be surprised by
the lack of broad agreement about the purposes of the criminal justice
system and the goals of sentencing and corrections.
55
The politics of crime were decidedly retributive and punitive,
however, and needed no coherence to succeed. They catered to the
public's fear of crime and its resentment of criminals, twisted the reform
movement out of shape, and steered the country down a road "so 'tough'
on crime that it would result in world record rates of incarceration":
56
The sentencing reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s prompted
America's reconsideration of its penal goals. Initially, this movement
seemed to be about reducing the sentencing disparities that can result
from the differing views and personalities of judges. The hawks and
doves of criminal process both welcomed it. In retrospect, however, the
movement appears to have been a Trojan horse whose procedural
facade concealed the soldiers of substantive change. It proved to be less
about correcting disparities than about radically altering sentencing
standards, decmphasizing the personal characteristics of offenders,
substituting aggregated for individualized sentences, enhancing the
power of prosecutors, and increasing the severity of criminal
penalties.
57
The label "penal populism" has been used by some authorities to
describe the country's turn toward punitive penology. 8 It reared its head
when rehabilitation began to lose its supporters, was never presented "as
a package for public debate," 59 gained unstoppable momentum during
54 "In 1970, every state and the federal system had an 'indeterminate sentencing
system' in which judges had wide discretion to decide who went to prison and to set
maximum and sometimes minimum prison terms. Parole boards decided when prisoners
were released." TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS, supra note 23, at 4.
55 Michael Tonry, The Fragmentation of Sentencing and Corrections in America,
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PAPERS FROM THE
ExEcuTivE SESSION ON SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 1, 3 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice 1999).
56 MAUER, supra note 20, at 53.
57 Alsehuler, supra note 28, at 9.
58 See Gottschalk, supra note 19, at 198.
9 Id. at 196.
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the last two decades of the twentieth century, and has only recently
shown some signs of exhaustion. It deserves most of the credit, or most
of the blame, for a criminal justice system that has "produced a wave of
building and filling prisons [that is] virtually unprecedented in human
history, 60 and for rates of incarceration that qualify as disgraceful when
measured against world standards.
E. Perspectives
The country's late twentieth-century thirst for incarceration of its
citizens is put in helpful perspective by statistical data contained in an
especially informative book entitled Race to Incarcerate.61 Included in
that data is a chart showing that the incarceration rates in state and
federal prisons for the period from 1925 to 1970 averaged only 110
inmates per 100,000 population,62 a period of "remarkable stability" in
63America's prison systems. The total inmate population (all state and
federal prisons) in 1972 stood at approximately 200,000, increased
gradually for the next 10 years (from 200,000 to 400,000), and
skyrocketed during the fifteen-year period 1982 to 1997." By 1997, the
total inmate population stood at approximately 1.2 million inmates,65 an
increase of 500% during a period in which the country's population
increased only 28%.66 Needless to say, the country was exceedingly busy
during part of this period providing new living quarters for inmates. "In
the ten-year period beginning in 1985, federal and state governments...
opened a new prison a week to cope with the flood of prisoners." 67 They
built them, opened them, and filled them, and by 1997 "there [were] five
times as many U.S. citizens locked up as there were twenty-five years
60 MAUER, supra note 20, at 9.
61 id.
62 See id. at 16-17. The information for this chart and for others included in Race to
Incarcerate was drawn from data reported by the Department of Justice's Bureau of
Justice Statistics.
63 Id. at 16. The rate at the beginning of the period was about 80 inmates per
100,000 population (in 1925) and at the end of the period was less than 100 inmates per
100,000 (in 1970). It spiked moderately upward during the Great Depression years
("perhaps because more crimes were being committed as a result of the difficult
economic circumstances") but never reached 140 inmates per 100,000 population during
this period. See id. at 17-18. Later, during the World War II years, the rate dropped
slightly below the average for the full period (This is perhaps because "many of the
young men who might otherwise have been committing crimes... were instead overseas
fighting for their country."). Id. at 16-18.
(4 See id. at 20.
61 See id.
61 See id. at 1.
67 Id.
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[earlier], for an overall rate of incarceration of 645 inmates per 100,000
population, or about one of every 155 Americans. ' 68 The country's facts
and figures on incarceration have only grown more startling since the
end of the period examined and reported upon in Race to Incarcerate.69
In addition to providing historical perspectives concerning the
country's thirst for incarceration, Race to Incarcerate provides some
eye-popping statistical comparisons of incarceration rates in America
with incarceration rates reported by countries around the world, using the
year 1995 for its comparisons. The study was designed "[t]o place some
perspective on the use of imprisonment in the United States," and
involved comparisons from "59 nations in Europe, Asia, and North
America for which data are available., 70 The study produced what the
author of the book called "a remarkable story.",71 The charts in Figures 1
and 2 show the study's comparisons between incarceration rates in the
United States and those of a selection of western nations, far eastern
nations, and former Soviet bloc nations:
Figure 1













Rate of Incarceration per 100,000 Population
6 Id. at 19.
69 See Bureau of Just. Stat., Corrections Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/corrcct.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) (summarizing current inmate population
statistics).
70 MAUER, supra note 20, at 19.
71 Id.
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Figure 2
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Although the comparisons speak loudly for themselves, Race to
Incarcerate offered its own sobering observations:
The U.S. rate of incarceration per capita now dwarfs that of almost all
[industrialized] nations: our nation locks up offenders at a rate six to
ten times that of most comparable countries. Ironically, the United
States now competes only with Russia for the dubious distinction of
maintaining the world lead in the rate at which its citizens are locked
up. Although the Cold War has ended and the arms race is essentially
over, these two nations with vastly different economies and social
conditions now are engaged in a race to incarcerate.
7 2
It is no great exaggeration to conclude, as one commentator has done,
that in its willingness to incarcerate citizens in pursuit of crime control,
"the United States remains off the charts."
73
III. KENTUCKY'S RACE TO INCARCERATE
A. Background
The state of Kentucky built the first prison west of the Allegheny
Mountains in Frankfort in 1799, and imprisoned its first inmate in
1800.74 The state leased the facility for operational purposes to private
citizens for several decades in return for a percentage of the profits from
72 1d. at9.
73 Gottschalk, supra note 19, at 197.
74 See Ky. DEP'T OF CORR., KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS HISTORY
1792-1850, at http://www.corrections.ky.gov/CorrectionsHistory/Corrections History_
Partl.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004) [hereinafter DEP'T OF CORR., CORRECTIONS
HISTORY 1792-1850].
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inmate labors (an early privatization of corrections).75 The inmate
population of the prison reached 200 by 1865,76 spurted to nearly 1000
by 1878, was reduced by executive pardons in order to relieve
overcrowded conditions, and stood at 800 inmates in 1880.
77
The state opened a new prison for about 400 inmates at Eddyville in
1890, added a juvenile facility called Kentucky Village (later to be
named Blackburn Correctional Complex) in 1897, and acquired acreage
for a correctional facility for girls and women at Pewee Valley in 1916.78
The inmate population increased substantially during the Great
Depression years, creating a need for additional prison capacity just as
the old Frankfort prison deteriorated beyond repair. 79 As a result, the
state demolished the Frankfort facility in 1937 and in that same year
opened a new prison at LaGrange, the Kentucky State Reformatory.
8 0
Before World War II, the prison population reached and exceeded
4000,8' but declined during and after the war years. 82 The rate moved
moderately up and down during the next two decades, 83 stabilizing
eventually at slightly less than 3000 inmates as the state entered the
1970s,8 4 with most of the inmates housed in the state's two main prisons
at Eddyville and LaGrange. The state's incarceration rate (number of
inmates per 100,000 population) stood at eighty-eight in 1970,85 a level
" See id.
76 See Ky. DEP'T OF CORR., KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS HISTORY
1851-1950, at http://www.corrections.ky.gov/CorrectionsHistory/CorrectionsHistory_




79 The state held 1559 prison inmates in 1922, 3499 in 1933, and 4300 in 1935,
notwithstanding that actual capacity in the latter year was only 2240. See id.
80 See id.
81 Records show that there were approximately 3000 inmates at LaGrange in 1942
(although 600 of them were paroled to enter military service) and about 1000 inmates at
Eddyville in 1944. See id.
82 In 1952, the inmate population was 1122 at Eddyville and 1969 at LaGrange. See
KY. DEP'T OF CORR., KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS HISTORY, 1951-1995, at
http://www.co(eations.ky.gov/CorrectionsHistory/CorrectionsHistoryPart3.htm (last
visited Sept. 25, 2004) [hereinafter DEP'T OF CORR., CORRECTIONS HISTORY 1951-1995].
83 The total reached 4000 by 1961, but retreated to 3300 by 1969. See id.
84 See Ky. Dep't of Corr., Felony Population Projections (2003) (unpublished, on
file with author) [hereinafter Dep't of Corr., Population Projections].
85 The number of inmates in 1970 was 2838, see id., and the general population of
Kentucky was 3,218,706. KY. STATE DATA CENTER, KENTUCKY AND COUNTY
POPULATIONS, 1900-2000, at http://ksdc.louisville.edu/sdc/census1990/copopl900_
2000.xls (last visited Sept. 25, 2004). This incarceration rate (and state rates described
elsewhere in the article) only counts inmates required to be held in state custody (i.e.,
convicted felons) and does not count inmates required to be held in local custody (i.e.,
persons convicted of misdemeanors).
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of incarceration that was neither exceptional by historical and national
standards nor indicative of "punitive penology." The state then entered a
brief period of stability in the prison system (some calm before the
storm) that provides a good benchmark for a quantitative assessment of
Kentucky's march through the tough-on-crime era.
B. Benchmarky
Neither the incarceration rate nor the total number of state inmates
changed much during the early 1970s. The state had 2838 inmates in
1970, 2992 in 1971, 3120 in 1972, 2991 in 1973, and 3093 in 1974,86 the
year the new penal code was enacted into law. The prisons were
relatively full, but there were no state prisoners being housed in county
jails 87 and the state had not engaged in major prison construction for
more than three decades. 88 The prison population reached 3216 and the
incarceration rate reached ninety-five per 100,000 population in 1975,89
the year the new penal code took effect. The state also had approximately
3500 offenders under supervision (i.e., on probation or parole) during
this period of time. 90
If for no other reason than the fact that budget problems are
responsible for some, if not most, of the new concerns over America's
incarceration practices, budget facts and figures from the benchmark
period need at least minimal attention. The annual cost for incarceration
during the early 1970s was approximately $3100 per inmate, and the
annual cost for supervision of persons on probation or parole was
roughly $580 per offender.91 The state's operating budget for the
Department of Corrections stood at slightly more than $7 million in 1970
and slightly more than $11 million in 1974 when the new penal code was
86 See Dep't of Corr., Population Projections, supra note 84.
87 See Ky. Dep't of Corr., State Felons Housed in Jails (2003) (unpublished, on file
with author) [hereinafter Dep't of Corr., Felons in Jails].
88 The most recently constructed prison at that time was the one at LaGrange. It was
built during the late 1930s, received its first inmates in 1937, and was formally dedicated
as a prison on October 9, 1939. See DEP'T OF CORR., CORRECTIONS HISTORY 1851-1950,
supra note 76.
89 This rate was calculated by combining the inmate number of 3216 (as reported by
the Department of Corrections) with the general population number of 3,396,000 (as
reported by the Bureau of the Census). See Dep't of Corr., Population Projections, supra
note 84; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 11
(1976).
90 See DEP'T OF CORR., CORRECTIONS HISTORY 1951-1995, supra note 82.
91 See id.
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enacted,92 costs that were not in any sense devastating to the state's
budget and that were in fact minuscule in comparison to what was
waiting just over the horizon.
C. The Deluge
Without the benefit of hindsight, the earliest signs that harsher
punishment was in store for Kentucky offenders were barely noticeable.
For much of the 1970s, and even earlier, the state's primary prison
facilities were operating at full capacity or above,93 which is nothing out
of the ordinary since prisons are built to be filled, and thus are almost
always bulging at their seams. Although undoubtedly nurtured somewhat
earlier, the first signs of a tougher attitude toward criminals bubbled to
the surface in 1976 (just a year after the new penal code took effect),
when the state initiated an expansion of prison facilities that would
qualify as extraordinary by any standard.94 In this one year alone, the
state opened three new minimum security prisons: one in Frankfort on
the site of the state's first prison, one in northern Kentucky for the
purpose of adding capacity for female inmates, and one in LaGrange
where the state already had another major prison facility. 95 More
strikingly and more importantly, though, the state announced plans to
build a major new prison in Oldham County called the Luther Luckett
Correctional Complex. 96 This announcement left little or no doubt about
the state's commitment to get tougher on crime.
At first, the inmate population in the state's prisons increased
gradually rather than dramatically. The number of incarcerated felons
increased by about 900 during the 1970s and stood at 3723 in 1980,
97
with most of the increase occurring during the last half of the decade.98
The incarceration rate (the number of inmates per 100,000 population) at
this time stood at 115, 99 not shockingly higher than the rate of 88 that had
existed at the beginning of the decade, and the rate was certainly not yet
off the charts. But the state's commitment to harsher punishment took
hold quickly and the deluge of inmates began, as shown in a chart drawn
92 See Ky. Dep't of Corr., Appropriations History DOC (2003) (unpublished, on file
with author) [hereinafter Dep't of Corr., Appropriations History].




97 See Dep't of Corr., Population Projections, supra note 84.
98 The number of inmates in the prison system was 2838 in 1970, a number that
increased by only 250 inmates by 1974 (the year the new penal code was enacted) and
then by an additional 650 inmates by the end of the 1970s. See id.
" See id.
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from Department of Corrections records and identified as Figure 3
below:
Figure 3








1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source: Kentucky Department of Corrections
As the chart shows, the inmate population more than doubled during
the 1980s (from 3723 to 8824), almost doubled again during the 1990s
(reaching 15,444 in 2000), and continued its staggering growth into the
twenty-first century (reaching a total of 17,330 in 2003). To put the
numbers into perspective, it is helpful to note that the state's overall
population increased by only 25% during the period from 1970 to 2000
(from 3,218,706 to 4,041,769)"°° while its inmate population increased
by a whopping 444% (from 2838 to 15,444). It is also helpful to note that
the rate of incarceration increased from 88 in 1970 to 382 in 2000 (an
increase of 434% for the period), and that the rate has continued to
increase after the turn of the century. The rate in 2003 stood at 423.101
10o See KY. STATE DATA CENTER, POPULATION 1900 THROUGH 2000, KENTUCKY AND
COUNTIES, at http://ksdc.louisville.edu/sdc/census1990/copop1900 2000.xls (last visited
Sept. 25, 2004).
101 The number of inmates reported for 2003 was 17,330 (as shown in Figure 3), and
the population for that year stood at 4,117,827. See Dep't of Corr., Population
Projections, supra note 84; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, KENTUCKY QUICKFACTS, at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
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D. Another Building Boom and Privatization
The deluge of inmates into the system could not have started at a
worse time, for in 1980 the state consented to a federal court decree
settling a class action challenge to overcrowded conditions in the prison
system and establishing population caps at the state's two principal
facilities (Eddyville and LaGrange).10 2 The solution was additional
prison construction and privatization. The state opened a new prison at
LaGrange (the Luther Luckett Correctional Complex) in 1981,103 opened
a second new facility in 1983 (Northpoint Training Center), commenced
construction of a third new facility in 1986 (Eastern Kentucky
Correctional Complex) with plans to open it in 1990, and expanded most
of its other facilities throughout the 1980s.1°4 Notwithstanding this
continuation of an unprecedented prison building boom, the demand for
prison beds continued to outstrip supply.
In 1986 the state placed its first inmate in a privately owned and
operated prison facility,'0 5 and shortly thereafter signaled an intention to
rely more heavily on private prisons in the future. 106 Nonetheless,
officials in the Corrections Department warned in the mid-1980s that
Kentucky would have to build a new prison "every two years until 1995"
if prevailing trends continued. 0 7 In 1988, after a decade of the heaviest
prison construction and expansion ever and some privatization of its
corrections responsibility, the state publicly acknowledged that it would
have 800 more inmates than beds by 1990.108 In fact, because of a
monumental problem involving the housing of state prisoners in the
county jail system, the situation was much worse than announced.
102 See DEP'T OF CORR., CORRECTIONS HISTORY 1951-1995, supra note 82.
103 See id.
104 For example, a new cellhouse was constructed at Eddyville in 1986, and capacity
was doubled at the Bell County Forestry Camp in 1986 and expanded at two other
minimum security facilities. The state's prison for women was expanded in 1989, new
beds were added at the reformatory at LaGrange, and construction was commenced on a
second phase of the new prison in Eastern Kentucky (Eastern Kentucky Correctional
Complex). See id.
105 In January 1986, the Department of Corrections moved ten inmates into the
Marion Adjustment Center, which was operated by the U.S. Corrections Corporation, and
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E. Filling the County Jails
The 1974 Penal Code required convicted felons to be committed to
the custody of the Department of Corrections,10 9 as did the preexisting
law. " Further, the state constitution seemed on its face to require that
such persons be housed in a state institution.111 No unmanageable
difficulty in complying with these requirements surfaced during the
1970s, although prison capacity came under some initial stress in 1980
because of the federal court consent decree described above. Not long
into the 1980s, however, just as it began to struggle with federal court
orders limiting the number of inmates that could be housed in state
institutions, the state discovered that it could not build prisons fast
enough to accommodate the tougher penal policies and practices that had
taken hold in the court system. In response, it developed a program to
control the intake of convicted felons into the state penal system and
embraced as an offshoot of that program a practice of leaving convicted
felons in county jails for indefinite periods of time until there were open
beds in state facilities."'
The number of inmates so placed was small at first (564 in 1983) and
stayed that way for a few years (623 in 1986)," 3 but it soon began to
reflect the state's inability to build prisons as rapidly as the judicial
system delivered inmates for incarceration.1 1 4 Local governments and
jailers complained about financial burdens caused by the program,
inmates complained about being incarcerated in local jails rather than
prisons, and both groups ultimately lodged their complaints with the
court system, filing lawsuits that reached the state's highest court in
1988.11
109 Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 282, 1974 Ky. Acts 874.
110 "This Section [unamended K.R.S. § 532.100] substantially restates existing law.
With few exceptions, sentences of one year or more are presently served in state
penitentiaries and designated facilities. . . . The same consequences will result from
application of Section 3455 .... " PENAL CODE: FINAL DRAFT, supra note 24, at 351.
111 See KY. CONST. § 252; see also Campbell County v. Kentucky Corr. Cabinet, 762
S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1988) ("For almost 100 years no one has seriously questioned the
constitutional mandate that state prisoners must be kept in the care and custody of the
state penal system.").
E12 See Campbell County, 762 S.W.2d at 7-8.
113 See Dep't of Corr., Felons in Jails, supra note 87.
114 From 1986 to 1987, for example, the number of state felons in local jails nearly
doubled (from 623 to 1187). See id.
1"5 Inmates in Fayette County's jail sought a court order requiring that they be
delivered immediately to the custody of the Corrections Department. Campbell and
Kenton Counties sought an order requiring the state to accept custody of convicted felons
inmmediately, and inmates who had been held in the Daviess County jail for months sued
for immediate transfer to state institutions. See Campbell County, 762 S.W.2d at 9, 11-
12.
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In this litigation, the state tried without success to rely on a
"necessity" argument, stating that it had no alternative to use of the
county jails, but the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the state has a
constitutional responsibility to provide for the care and custody of
convicted felons that cannot be shifted to local governments." 6 In so
holding, however, the court opened the door to an expanded program of
local incarceration by noting that the state could satisfy its constitutional
obligation by contracting with local jails for the care and custody of
inmates under its direct supervision." 7 At the time of this decision, the
state had 1146 convicted felons in county jails (seventeen percent of all
state prisoners), had absolutely no spare capacity in state facilities, and
had far more inmates on the way to prison than the state could house on
its own." 8
State use of the county jails increased suddenly after the 1988 court
decision (from 1146 inmates in 1988 to 1795 in 1990), decreased almost
as suddenly when two new prisons opened (one a private prison)," 9
stabilized for a short period (going from 1342 inmates in 1991 to 1503 in
1994), and then headed skyward as the inmate flow into the system
continued to outrun the state's intensive efforts to expand its facilities.'
20
The state opened a major new prison, the Green River Correctional
Complex, in 1994, added significantly to the facility in 1999,121 and
expanded many of its other facilities during the 1990s. But the number
and percentage of state inmates in local jails continued to grow, as shown
by records of the Department of Corrections in Figure 4 below:
116 See id. at 14. The court explained: "This then is the fundamental flaw in the
Correction Cabinet's defense based on inability to comply. The Constitution assigns the
responsibility for care and custody of convicted felons to state government as a
whole... . The basic equation is the state cannot pass penal statutes and create penalties
that generate more prisoners than it is willing and prepared to provide for." Id.
1..Id. at 14-15.
1Is See Dep't of Corr., Felons in Jails, supra note 87.
1"9 The state opened Phase I of the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex in 1990.
In that year it also began to house inmates in a private prison called Lee Adjustment
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Figure 4
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By the end of the decade, the state held 3236 prisoners in county jails,
more than twice as many as it held in those facilities just a decade earlier
and significantly more than it held in the entire corrections system when
the new penal code took effect in 1975.
With inmate flows from the judicial system showing no signs of
slowing at the beginning of the new century, the state made plans for
even greater use of county jails for incarceration of convicted felons.
After several years of housing state prisoners in county jails without
statutory authority to do so, 122 in 1992 the state obtained legislative
authority for an already decade-old practice of incarcerating persons
convicted of the penal code's least serious felony crimes (class D
felonies) in county jails if such persons received sentences of no more
than five years imprisonment.1 23 In 2000, undoubtedly because of
excessive inmate flows from the court system, the state obtained
legislative authority to use the jails to house other class D felons (those
receiving sentences of more than five years imprisonment) and for the
122 Some of this period predated the Campbell County jail litigation described above,
when the state's penal code seemed to require that convicted felons be housed in state
facilities. See K.R.S. § 532.100 (Banks-Baldwin 2004). The balance of this period
followed the Kentucky Supreme Court's approval of local incarceration of state inmates
and preceded action by the General Assembly to explicitly authorize such incarceration.
12, Act of Apr. 7, 1992, ch. 262, § 8, 1992 Ky. Acts 725-26.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
first time persons convicted of class C felonies (crimes carrying penalties
of five to ten years imprisonment).
24
Figures on state incarceration practices since the date of this
enactment suggest that the expanded authority arrived none too soon.
Since 1999, the state's total inmate population, housed in all state
facilities and county jails, has increased by 2283 (from 15,047 in 1999 to
17,330 in 2003). During this same period, the number of state prisoners
in local jails has increased by 1798,125 meaning that nearly eighty percent
of all new inmates ended up in county jails rather than state prisons. The
number of convicted felons in county jails stood at 5134 in 2003126 and is
undoubtedly growing, although Kentucky already ranks near the top of
states holding state prisoners in county jails. 127 Of all the deleterious
consequences that have flowed from Kentucky's race to incarcerate its
citizens, the decision to fill the county jails with convicted felons tops the
list, as discussed in Part V below.
F. The Costs of Getting Tough on Criminals
One of the legacies of twenty-five years of punitive penology is a
corrections budget that looks completely out of control to state budget
makers, and totally inadequate to corrections professionals who struggle
to provide opportunities for inmates to improve their fates upon release
from incarceration., Most of the tough-on-crime measures adopted
during the subject period were embraced without concern for costs or
price tags, since "no price was too high for initiatives that would protect
public safety.' 128 Estimates as to the nation's total cost of incarcerating
citizens (now numbering in excess of two million persons) reach as high
as $40 billion. 129 Estimates of total corrections costs would have to be
substantially higher since the nation has millions of additional citizens
under the supervision of parole and probation officers. 30 Few if any
124 Act of Apr. 7, 2000, ch. 384, § 3, 2000 Ky. Acts 1054-55.
125 Dep't of Corr., Felons in Jails, supra note 87.
126 See id.
127 "Louisiana had the largest percentage of its State inmate population housed in
local jails (45%). Two other States-Kentucky (31%) and Tennessee (26%)-had at least
25% of their population housed in local jail facilities." Paige M. Harrison & Allen J.
Beck, Prisoners in 2001, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 66, 69 (2002).
128 WILHELM & TURNER, supra note 22, at 1.
129 See Vincent Schiraldi & Judith Greene, Reducing Correctional Costs in an Era of
Tightening Budgets and Shifting Public Opinion, 14 FED. SENTENCING REP. 332, 332
(2002).
130 See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PROBATION AND PAROLE STATISTICS, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pandp.htm (last revised July 25, 2004) ("At year end 2003,
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items in state budgets could show the dramatic and relentless increases
that have now been experienced for three decades with corrections. The
Kentucky picture is undoubtedly typical of what could be found in the
budgets of most states.
The Kentucky corrections budget stood at slightly more than $7
million in 1970 (when the state held 2838 inmates) and at slightly more
than $11 million in 1974 (when the state's new penal code was
enacted). 131 That budget item quadrupled in the 1980s, doubled from that
elevated level in the 1990s, exceeded $300 million early in the new
century, and in 2002 stood at a level forty-five times greater than it was
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There is nothing mysterious about the startling increases shown by
this chart. A large part of the corrections budget is consumed by the cost
of incarcerating the inmate population. In 2003, the average annual cost
of incarcerating inmates stood at $17,194 per inmate,132 and substantially
more than this average for inmates housed in the state's biggest and most
over 4.8 million adult men and women were under Federal, State, or local probation or
parole jurisdiction.").
131 See Dep't of Corr., Appropriations History, supra note 92.
132 Ky. Dep't of Corr., Cost to Incarcerate FY 2002-03 (2003) (unpublished, on file
with author) [hereinafter Dep't of Corr., Cost to Incarcerate].
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important prison facilities. 33 The state's inmate population increased by
more than 600% from 1970 to 2003 and the corrections line in the budget
increased correspondingly, never exceeding by wide margins the bare
cost of incarcerating an ever-increasing number of inmates.
The appropriations described in Figure 5 only provided for the
operational costs of the corrections system. Appropriations needed for
construction of new facilities and expansion of old ones added
substantially to the costs of getting tougher on crime and criminals. The
Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex, opened in 1990, was
constructed at a cost of approximately $73 million, the Green River
Correctional Complex, completed in the mid-1990s, cost approximately
$44 million, and the newest facility, Elliott County Phases I and II, is
expected upon completion to have cost the state approximately $123
million.134 Yet, according to Corrections Department professionals who
have overseen this unprecedented prison-building boom in Kentucky,
there is no end in sight for these intimidating expenditures. 35
Law and policy makers have been warned repeatedly by
professionals in state government about escalating costs associated with
the get-tough-on-crime policies and practices currently embedded in the
law. At least one set of policy makers, the Capital Planning Advisory
Board,1 36 has recently taken note of this warning and of the need to
reexamine policies and practices that are believed to have pushed the
state's corrections budget beyond affordable boundaries:
During discussion of the population projection data and proposed
projects [for prison facility expansion], Board members have noted that
root causes for these population increases must be identified and
addressed because the state does not have the financial resources to
133 The average incarceration cost was $23,577 for each inmate at the state
reformatory at LaGrange, $23,096 for each inmate at the state penitentiary at Eddyville,
and $21,146 for each inmate in the women's prison. See id.134 See Capital Planning Advisory Board, 2004-2010 Statewide Capital
Improvements Plan (2003) (unpublished, on file with author) [hereinafter Capital
Planning Board, Improvements Plan]. The first phase of the new prison, which is now
complete, is calculated to have cost approximately $87 million, while the second phase,
which remains to be completed, is projected to cost approximately $35 million. See id.
135 In its 2003 presentation to the Capital Planning Advisory Board, the Department
of Corrections said it would need new beds for 4700 additional inmates by 2010 if
current trends continue, that there would have to be major expansions of existing
facilities, and that plans should be laid for a new major prison to be opened in 2010 (at a
construction cost of approximately $100 million). Id.
136 The Capital Planning Advisory Board oversees state construction projects. It has
members from all three branches of state government, advises the Kentucky General
Assembly, is staffed by personnel from the Legislative Research Commission, and
prepares and presents capital improvement plans to the General Assembly and other
segments of state government.
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construct the number of prison beds that would be needed if the
projected increases continue.' 37
It appears that the state may not even have the financial resources to
operate the facilities that it has already built, if recent public discussions
concerning its newest prison are fully or even partially justified.
On the eve of opening its newest prison in Elliott County, built at a
cost of $87 million, the state announced plans to either "mothball" the
new prison or turn it over to one of the country's corrections corporations
for operation as a private prison, although it was built entirely with state
dollars. 38 Although the state may eventually choke on these two options
and chart a different course for use of this facility, such as housing fewer
state inmates in county jails, the mere suggestion that the state may have
built a major new prison that it cannot afford to operate speaks volumes
about the need for some critical analysis of the tough-on-crime
movement that has left the state (and most of the country) with an
incarceration budget mess of huge proportions.
G. Conclusion
There is a whiff of criminal justice reform in the air for good reason.
Kentucky is in the midst of a budget crisis that has no foreseeable
termination date and, at the same time, is suffering from chronic prison
overcrowding that is almost sure to get worse before it gets better.
Sooner or later (and probably sooner), lawmakers will have to confront
the undeniable connection of these two factors and undertake a full
examination of the state's aggressive incarceration practices. When that
happens it will be important to know precisely what has happened to our
laws and to our attitudes toward criminals to produce incarceration levels
that have reached beyond anything that could have been imagined a
generation ago, and that systematically produces more prisoners for
incarceration than the state can handle (or, to use the words of the
Supreme Court, than the state "is willing and prepared to provide
for").' 39 The next part of the article is devoted to this important subject.
37 Capital Planning Board, Improvements Plan, supra note 134.
138 See Lee Mueller, New Elliott Prison Might Be Privatized, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Jan. 27, 2004, at BI.
'39 Campbell County v. Kentucky Corr. Cabinet, 762 S.W.2d 6, 14 (Ky. 1988).
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IV. TOUGHER LAWS AND TOUGHER ATTITUDES
A. Introduction
The sentencing (and punishment) provisions of the 1974 Kentucky
Penal Code were drawn mostly from the Model Penal Code and were
designed to preserve the state's 75-year-old commitment to the
rehabilitation of offenders. They fixed penalty ranges for felony
crimes, 14  gave sentencing authorities discretion to fix maximum
penalties within the ranges, 4  imposed indeterminate sentences on
convicted felons, 142 made no provision for minimum sentences for any
offenses, 43 and gave parole boards discretion to determine when
convicted felons should be released from custody.144 They authorized
trial judges to use probation in all cases except where a penalty of death
was imposed 4 5 and, like the Model Code from which they were drawn,
strongly encouraged judges to use sentences of probation in lieu of
sentences of imprisonment, explicitly providing that probation "should
be granted unless the court is of the opinion that imprisonment is
necessary for protection of the public.' 46
A penal code with these provisions on sentencing and punishment
could not have produced extraordinary, if not indefensible, levels of
imprisonment. The Kentucky Penal Code sought to promote the
reformation of offenders and embraced views on sentencing and
140 The Code grouped felonies into four classifications: Class D (not less than one
year nor more than five), Class C (not less than five years nor more than ten), Class B
(not less than ten years nor more than twenty), and Class A (not less than twenty years
nor more than life imprisonment). See Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 278, 1974 Ky. Acts
873.
141 The Code retained jury sentencing, but gave trial judges broad authority to reduce
prison terms fixed by juries so long as the reduced term fell within the penalty range
fixed by the General Assembly. See id. § 279.
14 Id. § 278(1).
43 "The actual length of his imprisonment is to be determined by the Parole Board
in much the same manner as is done under the existing process. No minimum period of
imprisonment is established in this code for a convicted felon." PENAL CODE: FINAL
DRAFT, supra note 24, at 342.
144 "KRS 439.340 provides that the Parole Board has sole responsibility for
determining eligibility for parole. This means that an offender could conceivably be
released from custody immediately after imposition of sentence. To some extent the
Parole Board has restricted its [own] discretion in this respect through the promulgation
of an administrative regulation which establishes a schedule for parole eligibility ..
Id. at 341.
145 See Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 285, 1974 Ky. Acts 875.
146 Id.; see also PENAL CODE: FINAL DRAFT, supra note 24, at 358 ("This section
seeks to establish a policy in favor of rehabilitation of offenders within the community
and free of incarceration.").
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punishment that were calculated to restrain rather than expand the use of
imprisonment to control crime. The Code clearly reflected the following
philosophies on sentencing: 1) the state should impose the least rather
than the most intrusive of punishments, 2) society's long-term interests
are best served by restoring offenders to full status in their communities
as soon as possible, and 3) imprisonment should never be allowed to
become a routine or semiautomatic punishment. Yet, since its enactment
in 1974, the state has experienced an inmate population explosion that
has overwhelmed the prison system, notwithstanding a prison-building
boom of astonishing proportions. How this happened is an interesting
and important inquiry, partly because it cannot be answered without a
study of how the state has toughened its criminal laws and its attitudes
toward offenders and partly because it leads naturally into a discussion of
the more compelling question of whether the state is using imprisonment
too much and at too high a cost to both the state and to inmates.
B. "Three Strikes" Law
The baseball metaphor ("three strikes and you're out") is used to
describe laws that provide for elevated levels of imprisonment for
habitual offenders and specifically for sentences of life imprisonment for
commission of a third offense. Kentucky had a "three strikes" law before
the 1970s law reform 14 7 and included that law in a modified form in the
1974 Code (calling it the "persistent felony offender" law).1 48 Under this
1974 law, a person convicted of a third felony offense was subjected to
penalty ranges higher than those that would normally apply to the
offense most recently committed by the defendant; for some third
offenses, the penalty range for the persistent felony offender included life
imprisonment (thus partially deserving the label "three strikes and you're
out"). 149 In what it chose to do with this law, almost before the ink was
dry on the 1974 Code, the General Assembly left no doubt that Kentucky
147 Under the pre-Code statute, a person convicted of a second offense received a
sentence twice what had been imposed for the first offense, and a person convicted of a
third offense received a sentence of life imprisonment. See K.R.S. § 431.190 (repealed).
148 Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 280, 1974 Ky. Acts 873.
149 The 1974 law provided that a persistent felony offender ("PFO") would be
sentenced under the following elevated penalties: 1) if convicted of a Class A felony
(which normally involves a sentence of twenty years to life) the PFO is sentenced to a
term of life imprisonment; 2) if convicted of a Class B felony (which normally entails a
sentence of ten to twenty years in prison) the PFO is sentenced to a prison term of not
less than twenty nor more than life); and 3) if convicted of a Class C felony (which
normally entails a sentence of five to ten years in prison) or a Class D felony (which
normally entails a sentence of one to five years in prison), the PFO is sentenced to a
prison term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years. Id. § 280(4).
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had joined the tough-on-crime movement. More importantly, it took an
early gigantic step toward much higher levels of incarceration for the
state prison system.
The 1974 Code carefully and deliberately guaranteed that its "three
strikes" law would be used only against high-rate offenders who had
been unresponsive to extended rehabilitation efforts by the state. In
addition to requiring the commission of a third offense (i.e., providing no
enhanced punishment for a second offense), the original "persistent
felony offender" provision of the Code explicitly required for "three
strikes" punishments that the defendant be found to have committed
his/her third offense after having been subjected to imprisonment on two
separate occasions.150 In this regard, the Code merely adopted a
longstanding Kentucky common-law-based position, 5 ' and in so doing
expressed a clear intent to have these exceptionally harsh punishments
used only as a last resort. The drafters of the Code included the
following statement in their official commentary on the "three strikes"
provision: "[T]he last resort idea implicit in the ... provision should be
applied with exceptional caution and not until an offender has clearly
demonstrated his incapacity for rehabilitation through normal terms of
imprisonment."'
52
And, at least as importantly, the 1974 Code did not close the door to
early releases from prison for offenders sentenced under the "three
strikes" law, choosing instead to classify their sentences as
indeterminate, and leaving it to the parole board to make the ultimate
decisions on release. 53 In taking this position, it chose to leave persistent
offenders with glimmers of hope for freedom and to give corrections
professionals the authority to release long term prisoners who cease to be
threats to public safety, a final exercise of special caution in using the
draconian sanctions of the "three strikes" law.
150 In one provision of the law, the General Assembly defined a previous felony
conviction as one for which "the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for such
conviction prior to commission of the present felony," and in a second provision of the
law, the General Assembly provided that "two or more convictions of crime for which
that person served concurrent or uninterrupted consecutive terms of imprisonment shall
be deemed to be only one conviction .. .. '" Id. § 280(2)-280(3).
151 As far back as 1936, construing an earlier Kentucky version of a "three strikes"
law, the Kentucky Court of Appeals erected identical obstacles to the use of enhanced
punishments: "[B]efore the present charge could be considered a third conviction of a
felony in contemplation of the statute, it was necessary that [the defendant] should have
been convicted of a second felony subsequent to his conviction of the first and after he
had paid the penalty inflicted for it; and, likewise, this third conviction should be
subsequent to the second, and after he had paid the penalty for it." Cobb v.
Commonwealth, 101 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Ky. 1936); see also Ross v. Commonwealth, 384
S.W.2d 234 (Ky. 1964) (same).
152 PENAL CODE: FINAL DRAFT, supra note 24, at 348.
153 Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 280, 1974 Ky. Acts 874.
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The caution that produced the relatively benevolent "three strikes"
law of the 1974 Code vanished in a historical flash and was nowhere to
be found when the General Assembly reassembled in the state capitol for
its 1976 session, exactly one year after the effective date of the new
Code. Tough-on-crime advocates arrived on the scene with a finn belief
that most crime is committed by a small group of incorrigible career
criminals and a determination to convert the still new and largely
untested "three strikes" law into a lethal weapon against repeat offenders.
At the end of the session they had exactly what they wanted: a
modification of the "three strikes" law that threw caution in sentencing
persistent offenders to the wind and provided Kentucky's prosecutorial
forces with one of the toughest "three strikes" laws ever enacted.
In this first session after enactment of the Code, the General
Assembly made four changes in the 1974 "three strikes" law. Each made
a different major change in the state's sentencing policies and practices
and, when combined with the other three, brought about what can only
be described as a monumental change of direction in the treatment of
convicted felons.
One: The first and most notable of the changes was an addition to the
persistent felony offender statute of a "two strikes" status, called
"persistent felony offender in the second degree." 154 The newly
defined status required proof that the defendant had committed the
charged offense after having been earlier convicted of a single felony
crime and, once established, it required that the defendant be
sentenced as though he or she had committed a felony offense
carrying a classification for penalty purposes one level higher than
the offense that had actually been committed. 155 A collateral effect of
this change was a new name for the "three strikes" status, which was
now called "persistent felony offender in the first degree.
Two: The second and perhaps most significant of the four changes
was an abandonment of the state's longstanding unwillingness to
classify defendants as habitual offenders (for purposes of harsher
punishments) before they had ever been subjected to actual
imprisonment for earlier offenses. 157 It mattered not after this change
14 Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 180, § 1, 1976 Ky. Acts 425.
55 In other words, a Class D felony (with a penalty range of one to five years) was
converted into a Class C felony (with a penalty range of five to ten years), a Class C
felony (with its five to ten year range) was converted into a Class B felony (with a
penalty range of ten to twenty years), and a Class B felony (with its ten to twenty year
range) was converted into a Class A felony (which at that time had a penalty range of
twenty years to life in prison). See id.156 1d. § 1(3).
157 The General Assembly needed two attempts to accomplish this objective. It
initially made the change during the 1976 regular session, but left the persistent felony
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that a defendant had been granted probation for an earlier offense
and had never stepped foot in a prison cell. The only thing now
needed for the harsher levels of punishment for repeat offenders was
proof that the defendant had been convicted of prior felony crimes."'
In accepting this change, the General Assembly backed away from
the state's longstanding commitment to rehabilitation (rather than
mere punishment) of offenders and at the same time rejected the
notion that "three strikes" laws are defensible only as a last resort
measure against incorrigible offenders.
Three: The third change eliminated the possibility of probation,
shock probation, and conditional discharge for all persistent felony
offenders. 159 The 1974 Code strongly encouraged trial courts to use
probation in lieu of imprisonment and put no limitations on their
authority to do so (except where a jury had imposed a sentence of
death). 160 The departure from this position for persistent felony
offenders was probably not substantively significant, since trial
judges would probably very rarely find probation suitable for repeat
offenders. But it was significant symbolically, because it occurred so
soon after enactment of the 1974 Code and because it reflected an
early willingness of the General Assembly to respond to demands for
tight restrictions on the judicial use of alternatives to imprisonment,
demands that would quickly extend far beyond the treatment of
persistent felony offenders.
Four: The fourth change was similar to the third but had more
significance, both substantively and symbolically. It affected the
availability of parole and read as follows: "A ... persistent felony
offender in the first degree shall not be eligible for ... parole until
having served a minimum term of incarceration of not less than ten
years.' 16' The 1974 Code left matters involving parole eligibility to
the parole board without exception (including parole eligibility for
extended terms under the "three strikes" law); 62 more importantly, it
offender law with considerable ambiguity as to both the "two strikes" and "three strikes"
laws. See id. In a 1976 special legislative session, the Assembly eliminated this
ambiguity, providing for use of the persistent felony offender law against persons who
had never been imprisoned for earlier crimes. See Act of Dec. 22, 1976, ch. 14, § 474,
1976 Ky. Acts (Extra Session) 174-75.
158 See Act of Dec. 22, 1976, ch. 14, § 474, 1976 Ky. Acts (Extra Session) 174-75.
159 See Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 180, § 1(5), 1976 Ky. Acts 425.
160 "Any person who has been convicted of a crime and who has not been sentenced
to death may be sentenced to probation or conditional discharge as provided in this
chapter." Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 285, 1974 Ky. Acts 875.
161 Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 180, § 1, 1976 Ky. Acts 425.
162 Drafters of Kentucky's 1974 Code noted that the state had a history of leaving
great discretion in the hands of the Parole Board: "The power to determine the period of
incarceration passes at this point to the Parole Board. At the present time, this board has
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provided for genuinely indeterminate terms of imprisonment for
felony offenders and did not provide for a single mandatory
minimum sentence. 63 In departing from these positions, the General
Assembly toughened the "three strikes" law enormously, especially
for persons committing the penal code's least serious classification
of offense. 164 In addition, it headed down a road that would one day
find the state's laws full of mandatory minimum sentences that play
a very substantial role in the state's chronic prison population
problem, with very little evidence that they work to reduce crime
rates and lots of opinion suggesting that they do not.
1 65
It is hard to find the right words to describe this repeat offender law after
these changes took effect, although the words "brutally harsh" come
readily to mind. The law was destined for heavy use and for a major
impact on the state incarceration rate, and that impact was not long in
manifesting itself in corrections statistics. In 1980, the state had only
seventy-nine inmates serving extended terms under the repeat offender
law.' 66 By 1984, that number had skyrocketed to 1142 inmates and had
only begun to have its long-term effect on the inmate population
explosion; in 2004, the state held an astonishing total of 4187 inmates as
persistent felony offenders.
1 67
exclusive control over that portion of sentence that a prisoner must actually serve. KRS
439.340 provides that the Parole Board has sole responsibility for determining eligibility
for parole." PENAL CODE: FINAL DRAFT, supra note 24, at 341. The following statement
leaves no doubt that the drafters intended to maintain this preexisting position in the 1974
Code: "The actual length of his imprisonment is to be determined by the Parole Board in
much the same manner as is done under the existing process." Id. at 342.
163 The following statement by drafters of the 1974 Code shows that the decision to
refrain from the use of minimum mandatory sentences was deliberate and calculated: "No
minimum period of imprisonment is established in this code for a convicted felon .
Id. at 342.
'64 A person who commits a Class D felony (e.g., theft by deception of property
worth $300 or more) faces a penalty range with a maximum that falls somewhere
between one and five years. A person who commits such an offense and who is classified
as a first degree persistent felony offender faces a penalty range with a maximum that
falls somewhere between ten and twenty years, and under the fourth change of the "three
strikes" law must serve at least ten years of that elevated term. Stated more explicitly, a
person who might have received from the jury a sentence of one year in prison (for theft
of property worth $300) cannot receive from the jury a sentence of less than ten years,
might receive as much as twenty years, and must serve at least a full ten years before
being considered for parole. See Act of Mar. 24, 1976, ch. 180. § 1, 1976 Ky. Acts 425.
165 "The primary and strongest argument for mandatory penalties is that their
enactment and enforcement deter would be offenders and thereby reduce crime rates and
spare victims' suffering. This claim, if true, makes a powerful case. Unfortunately, both
the accumulated evidence and expert opinion agree that it is not true." TONRY,
SENTENCING MATTERS, supra note 23, at 136.
166 See DEP'T OF CORR., CORRECTIONS HISTORY, 1951-1995, supra note 82.
167 E-mail from Jerry W. Somers, Information System Supervisor, Department of
Corrections, to author (May 6, 2004) (on file with author).
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The General Assembly made additional changes to the "three
strikes" law in later sessions. In the middle of the 1990s, it softened the
penalties slightly for repeat offenders of the lowest level, 168 explicitly
indicating that it was driven to do so by "current prison and jail
overcrowding." 169 In its most recent action, however, it has added to the
harshness of the penalties by further reducing the possibility of parole for
any repeat offender of either the first or second degree who is found to
have committed "a violent act."' 70 At present, this law (the "two strikes"
and "three strikes" in combination) is one of the toughest in the whole
country and has played a major role in pushing the inmate population to
unprecedented, if not unmanageable, levels. Moreover, it has contributed
greatly to projections of much higher numbers in the years ahead. For
these reasons alone, it will draw early attention and critical scrutiny as
lawmakers tire of overcrowded prisons and strapped budgets and begin
to look seriously for ways to reduce the masses in or headed toward
prison. What may emerge from such scrutiny are questions, maybe some
doubt, concerning the need, effectiveness, and fairness of the provision.
The "three strikes" laws are aimed at a real problem and no one can,
or should, deny that reality. These laws are based on the beliefs that lots
of crime is committed by a small number of bad actors, that deterrence
and incapacitation of such actors can significantly reduce crime rates,
and that the best way to identify high-rate offenders is to rely upon a
count of their prior criminal convictions. In determining whether the
laws are effective, fair, and sound, at least the following issues have to be
addressed: 1) Are the underlying beliefs grounded in reality (especially
the promise of heightened crime control)? 2) Do the benefits of such
laws (if they exist) outweigh their costs (especially with respect to their
impact on inmate populations)? 3) Do they inflict unwarranted and
unjustified punishments on some offenders, especially those who engage
in nonviolent crimes such as theft and drug possession? Proponents of
"three strikes" laws argue that such laws are effective in reducing crime,
168 In 1994, the General Assembly restored the eligibility for parole of persistent
felony offenders whose most recent offense was a Class D felony (thereby eliminating for
this one type of repeat offender the ten-year minimum term of imprisonment). See Act of
Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 396, § 11, 1994 Ky. Acts 1196. The General Assembly acted in the
next session to make this new law on parole of Class D offenders retroactive. See Act of
Apr. 4, 1996, eh. 247, § 1, 1996 Ky. Acts 979.
169 Act of Apr. 4, 1996, ch. 247, § 2, 1996 Ky. Acts 980.170 Although somewhat ambiguous, the enactment in 1998 appears to require that
any persistent offender (first or second degree) who is found to have committed a violent
act (even one who is convicted of only a Class D felony) must serve no less than eighty-
five percent of the extended term of imprisonment he receives under the "three strikes"
(and now "two strikes") law. See Act of Apr. 14, 1998, ch. 606, § 76, 1998 Ky. Acts
3641-43.
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while critics argue that they are grounded in false assumptions, impose
huge costs on justice systems, and inflict unwarranted punishments on
offenders. Lawmakers have generally enacted the laws without much
consideration of the questions described above.
Simple common sense would suggest that greater punishment is
likely to produce greater deterrence, a conclusion that would make
something of a case for "three strikes" laws if it were true. The problem,
according to the best authorities on the subject, is that "both the
accumulated evidence and expert opinion agree that it is not true."'
17 1
Deterrence is a function of two things: "the potential offender's
perception of the severity of the sanction and the likelihood that it will be
imposed."'' 72 Some authorities believe that repeat offenders are less
fearful than normal of apprehension and conviction and thus are not
likely to be deterred by harsher punishments. 7 3 Others are far more
skeptical generally about the deterrent effect of long-term mandatory
penalties:
After the most exhaustive examination of the question ever undertaken,
the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Research on Deterrent and
Incapacitative Effects concluded, "In summary .. we cannot assert
that the evidence warrants an affirmative conclusion regarding
deterrence." The panel's principal consultant on the subject . . . was
less cautious: "The evidence is woefully inadequate for providing a
good estimate of the magnitude of whatever effect may exist ...
Policymakers in the criminal justice system are done a disservice if
they are left with the impression that the empirical evidence .. .
strongly supports the deterrence hypothesis.' 74
If this is so, common sense may be all that exists to support the belief
that "three strikes" laws work to deter the activity of repeat offenders.
A stronger argument in support of the laws can be made on the basis
of the belief that they reduce crime rates by incapacitating career
criminals for longer periods of time. However, the common sense in this
conclusion is once again put in doubt by the results of careful study by
impeccable authorities:
171 TONRY, SENTENCING MATERS, supra note 23, at 136.
172 Linda Beres & Thomas Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal
Deterrence, 34 CoNN. L. REV. 55, 61 (2001) [hereinafter Beres & Griffith, Deterrence].
173 "Offender discounting of prison terms is consistent with empirical evidence
suggesting that increasing the probability of conviction is a more effective deterrent than
increasing the severity of the sentence." Id. at 65-66.
174 ToNRY, SENTENCING MATTERS, supra note 23, at 136-37 (internal citations
omitted).
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[T]hree-strikes laws are sometimes premised on incapacitative
rationales. Here too the clear weight of research findings is inconsistent
with proponents' claims. In the 1970s, vigorous arguments were made
that crime would be reduced substantially by adoption of policies
calling for incarceration of all defendants convicted of particular crimes
(sometimes called "collective incapacitation"). The National Academy
of Sciences Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects,
however, soon demonstrated that such a policy would be ineffective.
Most offenders commit few or no additional offenses; the vast increase
in prison populations required to implement such policies could not be
justified in cost-benefit terms. Few informed calls for adoption of
collective incapacitation policies have been made since the early
1980s.'
In support of this position, it is argued that high-rate offenders are
likely to spend most of their lives in prison without "three strikes" laws
because courts will fix long sentences for such offenders and those
sentences will be served 176 (and especially violent offenders who qualify
for lengthy imprisonment without penalty enhancements). And it is
argued that the "three strikes" laws have less effect on crime rates than
one might expect because of the fact that criminal careers, even for high
rate offenders, begin at an early age and on their own diminish in a
relatively short time. 77 Additionally and most importantly, it is argued
that the difficulty of identifying repeat offenders in advance robs "three
strikes" laws of their effectiveness and legitimacy at an extremely high
cost by producing an incarceration of untold numbers of low rate
offenders not likely to commit additional crimes in the absence of
extended terms of incarceration.
178
175 Id. at 138-39 (internal citations omitted).
176 "We conclude that even if such statutes sentence high-rate offenders to long
prison terms, they will have little impact on the crime rate because most high-rate
offenders will spend most of their criminal career in prison even without such statutes."
Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do "Three Strikes" Laws Make Sense? Habitual
Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103, 118 (1998) [hereinafter
Beres & Griffith, Incapacitation].
177 "Put another way, people begin to desist from property crimes after age
seventeen and from violent crimes after age twenty-two. By the time offenders have
accumulated enough convictions to make it reasonable to conclude that they are high-rate
serious offenders, many will have reached ages at which they will soon desist from
offending in any event. Extended confinement of such people will result in relatively
little but very expensive crime prevention through incapacitation ..... TONRY,
SENTENCING MATTERS, supra note 23, at 139.
178 Michael Tonry summarizes the difficulties: "The National Academy of Sciences
Panel on Criminal Careers and 'Career Criminals' considered the evidence concerning
selective incapacitation and concluded that it, too, was impracticable . . . . The
insuperable empirical problem was that no system of prediction could be developed that
would identify high-rate serious offenders in advance with ethically defensible and
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Then there is the problem of how far to go with these laws, made
more difficult by the above described doubts as to whether they really
deliver on the promise of crime reduction. Should they be used only
against offenders who engage in violent crimes, or should they be used
against all repeat offenders? Most scholars contend that the laws should
be applied only to violent offenders, some out of fear of runaway
incarceration rates 179 and some out of fear of unjust punishment of minor
offenders. 180 Others express particular concern over use of the laws
against drug offenders.1 " Most "three strikes" statutes define "strikes" as
prior violent felonies and then require that the charged offense also be a
violent felony (a double limitation). 182 Even California's much maligned
"three strikes" statute extends its harsher punishments only to offenders
who have committed two prior serious and/or violent offenses, although
the triggering offense is not required to be a violent felony. 183 In
comparison with both the position recommended by scholars and the
"three strikes" laws that exist in other jurisdictions, the Kentucky statute
is simply "off the charts." It defines prior "strike" as any felony crime, is
triggered by the commission of any felony offense, and thus is essentially
unlimited in its application to repeat offenders, especially since it has a
"two strikes" as well as a "three strikes" component. As a result, it has a
economically affordable accuracy. Even the best prediction instruments overpredicted by
3 or 4 to 1. For each future high-rate offender incapacitated, two or three other people
would also have to be confined for an extended period." Id.
179 "Three Strikes statutes are designed to incapacitate selectively high-rate
offenders of serious crimes. The selectivity of such statutes is compromised if . . . the
statutes apply to minor offenses.... [T]he number of low rate offenders is so large that
incarcerating even a small portion of them for terms of twenty years or more imposes a
significant burden on the criminal justice system." (Beres & Griffith, Incapacitation,
supra note 176, at 133).
'go "[L]engthy prison terms ... should be limited to serious crimes like armed
robbery, aggravated rape, and murder. The . . . most extreme injustices in individual
cases, arises under laws requiring severe penalties for minor crimes like possession or
trafficking of small amounts of drugs." TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS, supra note 23, at
136.
181 See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395,460 (1997) ("The terms of imprisonment for drug offenses
have also increased, creating anomalies where some drug offenders are incarcerated for
longer terms than far more dangerous offenders.") [hereinafter Vitiello, Three Strikes].
1g2 Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes'
Overblown Promises, 90 CAL. L. REv. 257, 261-62 (2002) ("[M]ost "three strikes"
legislation in other states targets only violent crime .... ") [hereinafter Vitiello,
Punishment]; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501 (Michie 1987) (felonies involving
violence); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (1997) (violent felonies); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:529.1 (West 1991) (crimes of violence).
183 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1994).
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huge effect on normal sentencing laws and practices, is capable of
producing punishments that have no rational relationship to the crimes
for which they are imposed, and has undoubtedly contributed
substantially to the population problems that plague the state's
corrections system.
The Kentucky law elevates punishments significantly at every level
of crime, but it has its greatest and most troublesome effects on offenders
who commit the state's least serious felonies or who commit drug
offenses. The following situations are designed to illustrate how penalties
imposed under this law can lose all proportionality to the conduct for
which they are imposed:
Example 1: Imprisonment in this situation is to be imposed on a
person who unlawfully took goods worth $300 from a store and
committed the crime of theft (shoplifting). Theft is ordinarily
punishable by imprisonment of not less than one nor more than five
years (a class D felony), a penalty range that fixes one year in prison
as a standard penalty for the offense and then provides ample room
for significantly harsher punishment for deserving offenders
(including persons with prior records of conviction). However, if
elevated by the "two strikes" provision of the Kentucky law, theft
becomes a class C felony punishable by imprisonment of no less than
five nor more than ten years; and, if elevated by the "three strikes"
provision it becomes a class B felony that is punishable by
imprisonment of not less than ten nor more than twenty years.
Consequently, for his or her $300 theft, the shoplifter would get no
less than five and could get ten years under the two-strikes law and
would get no less than ten and could get twenty years under the
"three strikes" law. In other words, in the latter situation the
shoplifter could receive twenty times the standard penalty of one
year for the crime of theft; under the "two strikes" law, the shoplifter
would get no less than one year in prison for every $60 stolen and
under the "three strikes" law no less than one year for every $30
stolen.18
4
Example 2: Imprisonment in this situation is to be imposed on a
twenty-one year old who sells a small amount of marijuana to a
seventeen-year-old acquaintance or friend and thereby commits the
184 In case you think this scenario is unreal, consider the following report by one of
the state's circuit judges: "Once a few years ago I had to sentence a poor black mother of
five children to ten years because she appropriated someone's social security check after
two priors for bad checks. She actually entered a guilty plea to PFO 1. Admittedly, she
didn't seem to learn much from her priors, and stealing some poor older person's social
security check is pretty reprehensible, but with five kids and little wherewithal, perhaps
understandable. There had to have been a better solution for her." Letter from Mary C.
Noble, Fayette Circuit Judge, to author (Sept. 1, 2004) (on file with author).
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offense of selling controlled substances to a minor. The offense is
classified as a C felony and thus is severely punished as a first
offense-no less than five nor more than ten years in prison. If
elevated by the "two strikes" law, it becomes a class B felony
punishable by imprisonment of no less than ten nor more than twenty
years (doubling both the lowest and highest possible penalties for a
first offense); if elevated by the "three strikes" law, the offender is
again subject to class B felony penalties (not less than ten nor more
than twenty years) but in this instance is required to serve ten years
before gaining eligibility for parole consideration. Even conceding
that selling drugs to a minor is a serious offense, one must surely
doubt the proportionality of penalties for selling a small amount of
marijuana to a peer that equal or exceed the law's penalties for such
crimes as attempted murder, kidnapping, assault causing serious
bodily injury, most rapes and sodomies, all burglaries, and all
robberies.
What these hypothetical situations illustrate above all else is how a
"three strikes" law renders the seriousness of an offender's conduct
irrelevant to his sentence and permits (and sometimes even requires)
punishment that is morally indefensible, that debases all notions of
common sense, and that works to warehouse for extended periods
offenders who are not likely to inflict serious harm on the public. It has
been said that "[t]he story surrounding "three strikes" is symptomatic of
the excesses of our nation's crime prevention policy during the 1980s
and 1990s,,,18' an observation that seems especially appropriate when
thinking of a Kentucky law that easily qualifies as one of the toughest
"three strikes" laws ever enacted.
C. Tougher Parole
The 1974 Penal Code delegated full discretion to the Parole Board to
determine the ultimate punishment to be imposed on felony offenders.
186
It did so by giving courts the authority to fix maximum terms of
imprisonment (within statutory ranges) and by giving the Parole Board
authority to determine release dates within the maximum terms fixed by
the courts (including the authority to establish initial eligibility
requirements). It gave courts no authority to establish minimum terms of
imprisonment and did not contain a single provision requiring felony
offenders to serve fixed periods of time before being considered for
parole. It left the door always open to the possibility of early release from
185 Vitiello, Three Strikes, supra note 181, at 395.
186 See PENAL CODE: FrNAL DRAFT, supra note 24, at 341.
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incarceration (by shunning the use of mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment), laid the foundation for a liberal rather than a hesitant use
of parole in making final decisions on punishments, and in so doing built
something of a barrier to an excessive reliance on incarceration in efforts
to control crime. 
187
Parole was used liberally before the tough-on-crime movement and
undoubtedly served to suppress prison populations (although that was not
its purpose). Kentucky's parole practices of the early 1970s show that
felony offenders were far more likely to complete service of prison
sentences on the street, under the supervision of parole officers, than in a
prison facility:
Year Hearings Paroles Deferrals Serve Outs
1972-73 2,532 51% 30% 19%
1973-74 2,466 53% 28% 19%
1974-75 2,814 51% 32% 17%18s
National statistics demonstrate that the Kentucky experience of this
period was not unique: "In the late 1970s, approximately 70 percent of
prison releases were discretionary parole releases entering the
community because of a parole decision."' 189 By this time, however, the
tide had turned against the rehabilitation model, tough on-crime
advocates had taken aim on the whole concept of parole, and the
situation and numbers were headed toward a dramatic adjustment.
The first shot against parole in Kentucky took the form of mandatory
minimum terms of imprisonment for repeat offenders. In 1976, as
discussed above, the General Assembly imposed a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten years in prison for persistent felony offenders in the first
degree (i.e.; persons committing a third offense after two prior
convictions).' 90 Nearly two decades later, in 1994, the General Assembly
dropped this mandatory minimum for repeat offenders most recently
committing a class D felony, 91 but kept it intact for all other repeat
offenders. 92 In 1986, the General Assembly moved against parole
practices for "violent offenders,"'193 imposing a mandatory minimum of
187 See id.
'" See Ky. Parole Bd., Summary of Parole Board Activities from July 1, 1972 to
July 1, 1973 (1973); Ky. Parole Bd., Parole Board Statistical Report: 1973-74 (1974);
Ky. Parole Bd., Parole Board Statistical Report: 1974-75 (1975).
189 MACKENzIE, supra note 27, at 22.
190 Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 180, § 1, 1976 Ky. Acts. 425.
191 Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 396, § 11, 1994 Ky. Acts 1196.
192 See K.R.S. § 532.080(7) (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
193 "As used in this section, "violent offender" means any person who has been
convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of a capital offense, Class A felony, or
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twelve years for some violent offenders and requiring for all such
offenders that they not be released before serving at least fifty percent of
their sentences.1 94 In 1998, the General Assembly got even tougher on
the violent offender, increasing the mandatory minimum term to twenty
years of imprisonment and requiring that all such offenders not be
released from custody before serving eighty-five percent of their
sentences. 15 The end result is an ever-growing number of offenders
without eligibility for parole, a phenomenon that has had a substantial
impact on the inmate population problem described above, although the
full effects of the most recent and far-reaching of these changes (most
notably the eighty-five percent requirement) have yet to be felt.
The tougher laws on parole have probably had more of an impact on
the attitude toward the use of parole than on inmate numbers. The
dilemma faced by the Parole Board is usually between a desire to protect
the public from the commission of additional crimes and a desire to
provide for supervised release of the inmate (and the assistance that goes
with such release). Needless to say, decisions and rates of release
ultimately depend upon the Board's willingness to run the risk of
additional crimes by the inmate, for that risk cannot be eliminated from
the equation. The Board has performed its duties for more than fifty
years under a very flexible yardstick for granting or denying parole ("the
best interest of society and not as an award of clemency"' 6), but for at
least two decades the Board has done so under the influence of a
nationwide movement against the very idea of parole. It should be no
surprise that under the influence of this movement (and the broader
tough-on-crime movement), the Parole Board has put a premium on
public safety and a damper on its enthusiasm for the use of parole.
No dramatic departures from prior practices can be found in
Kentucky's parole statistics through the 1970s. Mandatory minimum
terms were still fairly insignificant, supervised', release continued to have
the support of most corrections professionals, a'nd punitive penology had
only begun to have its effect on sentencing policies and practices.
The picture began to change during the 1980s and got even tougher
on inmates during the 1990s, as the Parole Board grew increasingly more
reluctant to grant parole (as shown by the data in Figure 6 below) and
increasingly more willing to order full term serve-outs (as shown by the
data in Figure 7 below):
Class B felony involving the death of the victim, or rape in the first degree, or sodomy in
the first degree of the victim or serious physical injury to a victim." Act of Apr. 9, 1986,
ch. 358, § 1, 1986 Ky. Acts 786-87.
194 See id.
195 Act of Apr. 14, 1998, ch. 606, § 77, 1998 Ky. Acts 3643.
19' K.R.S. § 439.340(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
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The Board did not merely slip into a tougher stance on parole. It
carefully weighed the downside risk of releasing greater numbers of
inmates "without restriction, supervision and access to certain
community resources"'197 against the need to protect the public from
criminal acts, and tilted very strongly in favor of the latter: "Without a
doubt, public protection is the primary function served by the Parole
Board and the parole system."' 9 8 It understood the relationship between
parole and prison populations, knew that tougher parole would have a
dramatic effect on incarceration rates that were already standing at record
levels,' 99 but was focused above all else on protecting the public from
197 "It does concern the Board that 20% of all the inmates who received a parole
hearing in 1989 were ordered to serve-out their sentence[s]. This means that these
individuals who the Board viewed as very poor parole risks will be released from
incarceration at their conditional release date and return to their communities without
restriction, supervision and access to certain community resources." Ky. Parole Bd., 1989
Annual Report of the Kentucky Parole Board 26 (1989).
'9" Id. at 4.
'99 The clearest indication that the Board acted with full awareness of its effect upon
prison population numbers is contained in the following statement from its 1989 annual
report: "The total number of inmates paroled has fluctuated over the years but it is
significant to note that 2534 paroles were granted in 1989 as compared to 2975 in 1980.
The corresponding number of intakes to the prison system for these years was 4482 and
2716 respectively. Simple subtraction indicates that in 1980 approximately 250 more
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additional inmate crime (even at the cost of overcrowded prisons):
"Public protection . . . is and will remain the primary function of the
Board rather than inmate population control.
200
The information in Figures 6 and 7 shows that parole got steadily
tougher in Kentucky from 1985 to 2002; the information in Figure 3
shows that the state's inmate population increased during this same
period from 5745 to 16,420 (an increase of 10,675 inmates). The
connection between the two is obvious and substantial.
D. The War on Drugs
America's drug problem is and has been enormous:
A 1991 survey revealed that 74.4 million (36.2%) of Americans aged
twelve and older reported using an illegal drug at least once during
their lifetime .... For those adults under the age of twenty-five, an
estimated 15.8% have used cocaine at least once, and for those between
the ages of twenty-six and thirty-four, an estimated 25.2% have used
cocaine.
20 1
In addition to supplying the criminal justice system with an ever-
increasing number of drug charges, the nation's appetite for illegal drugs
is blamed for a high percentage of the country's violent crimes,20 2 is
undoubtedly responsible for higher levels of property crimes, 03 and fully
deserves to be blamed for the devastating effects on individuals, families,
and even whole communities and for inflicting literally unbearable costs
on society and on the justice system in particular. It is no wonder that
there has been widespread public alarm and resentment, an equally
widespread belief that special measures were needed to curb the tide, and
that there was ultimately a declaration of war on the problem (the so-
inmates were paroled than entered prison. In 1989, however, almost 2000 more inmates
came into prison than were paroled." Id, at 30.
200 Id. at 6.
201 Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction,
40 VILL. L. REv. 335, 339 (1995).
202 "Drugs such as cocaine, amphetamines and PCP, for example, affect
physiological function, cognitive ability and mood. These effects increase the likelihood
that users will act violently; at least sixty percent of violent crime is associated with drug
use." Id. at 341.
203 "Other drug-related offenses may be motivated by the user's need for money to
support continued use. Overall, 13.3% of convicted jail inmates in 1989 said that they
committed their offense to obtain money for drugs. Some users commit property crimes
to support their habits. Other users resort to prostitution, or increase their prostitution
activity to finance their drug habits when drug prices rise." Id.
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called "war on drugs"). The war on drugs produced, above all else, a
much tougher set of laws against users, dealers, and traffickers (harsher
penalties, mandatory minimum sentences, lesser uses of probation and
parole, etc.), an intensified law enforcement effort at all levels of
government, and a determination to bring the problem under control
without regard to costs or consequences.
The war effort included a little money for prevention and treatment
(with an eye on the demand for drugs) and a lot for law enforcement and
interdiction efforts (with an eye on reducing supply). The effort was
affected to a significant degree by the politics of crime:
By 1992, the federal drug control budget had risen to almost $12
billion, with only a small portion slated for prevention and treatment.
For politicians, addressing the drug problem meant little more than
"getting tough on drugs." After all, it was easy to count the numbers of
arrests and convictions for drug crimes, of users and dealers placed in
prison cells, and of seizures of cocaine-laden vessels in the Caribbean,
and this number counting made for good fodder for those on the
election beat. Increasing the number of treatment beds appeared to be a
"soft" approach, and as for prevention, that was not something you
could count.2 °4
The idea was to control the problem by reducing illegal activities at both
the user and supplier ends of the spectrum, and to do so mostly through
the combination of tougher laws and tougher enforcement, an incredibly
daunting challenge at the user end of the spectrum to say the least:
There are vast numbers of hard core drug users who possess and obtain
drugs. These numbers are far greater than the numbers of users and
drug offenders who are now incarcerated and who potentially could be
incarcerated. In 1991, there were over 6 million cocaine users, 5.7
million users of hallucinogens and inhalants, and approximately
700,000 heroin users. According to one estimate, only about one-
eighth of the hard-core cocaine and heroin abusers are now
incarcerated. If we add the "non-user" offenders to these "user"
offenders, there are so many offenders that it is fiscally and practically
unrealistic to incarcerate more than a small number of them.
205
The war on drugs continues, the drug problem persists, noises about
getting tougher on drug offenders have softened and are heard less often,
204 James A. Inciardi, The Irrational Politics ofAmerican Drug Policy: Implications
for Criminal Law and the Management of Drug-Involved Offenders, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 273, 277 (2003).
205 Spencer, supra note 201, at 367-68.
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and lawmakers have occasionally been heard to suggest that a different
approach might be needed.2 6 In the meantime, professionals in the
nation's corrections systems have been left with inmate flows from the
war on drugs that are staggering, if not overwhelming.
The war on drugs has drawn a lion's share of blame for the most
serious of the nation's corrections problems and/or dilemmas. 20 7 The
following observations on the subject from two different sources provide
both content and perspective:
Both the number and the proportion of drug offenders in prison have
exploded. In 1980, the drug incarceration rate was 15 inmates in state
and federal prisons per 100,000 adults. By 1996, the rate had increased
more than ninefold to 148 per 100,000, "a rate greater than that for the
entire U.S. prison system in the fifty years to 1973."20
At the Federal level, prisoners incarcerated on a drug charge make up
nearly 60% of all inmates. Since 1980, the number of drug offenders in
state prisons has increased thirteen-fold, and drug offenses now
comprise one-fifth of all state prisoners. Most of these persons are not
high-level actors in the drug trade, and most have no prior criminal
record for a violent offense. There is scant empirical evidence
suggesting that this "get tough" policy has had any appreciable effect
on stemming the flow of drugs into the country or decreasing the use of
209illicit narcotics.
Nothing less could have been expected from policies that were designed
to deter users at all costs and to incapacitate through lengthy
imprisonment anyone who looked or smelled like a drug dealer. The war
on drugs was driven from the beginning by a commitment to get tough
on offenders, and that objective was pursued aggressively for two
decades, with very little if any thought to the possibility that the end
206 See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 22 (summarizing state legislators' efforts at
reform); WILHELM & TURNER, supra note 22, at 1-2 (describing how some lawmakers
"have revisited ...sentencing policies and instituted limited reforms (e.g. reducing
sentencing ranges and repealing mandatory minimums)" as part of an effort to control
correctional budgets); O'Hear, supra note 22, at 3 (describing reform of mandatory
minimum laws in Connecticut and Wisconsin).
207 See, e.g., Inciardi, supra note 204, at 280 ("Largely as a consequence of this
emphasis on drug enforcement on the nation's streets, approximately 6.3 million adults-
some 3.1% of the nation's adult population-were under correctional supervision (prison,
probation, or parole) at the end of the 1990s.").
208 Gottschalk, supra note 19, at 201.
209 The Sentencing Project, Impact of Drug Policy, at http://www.sentencing-
project.org/issues_09.cfm (Sept. 23, 2004).
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product might be a "bloated prison system with little impact on substance
abuse. 210
The Kentucky experience with the drug problem seems to closely
resemble the national experience, although historical data for comparison
purposes is harder to find. The state definitely got tougher on drug
offenders (as discussed below) and as a result had to provide for
incarceration of more inmates for longer periods of imprisonment in
already crowded facilities. The impact of this initiative on the corrections
system was immediate, has become clearer and substantially more
burdensome in recent years, and remains as the most prominent
component of the state's overall growth of incarceration. Figure 8 is
drawn from data showing the number of drug offenders held by
Kentucky each year from 1992 to 2003:
Figure 8
Drug Offenders in Kentucky Facilities
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2 11
In several respects, the statistics of this chart are disconcerting. The
number of drug offenders held in Kentucky's corrections system in the
year 2003 (totaling 3632) exceeds the number of prisoners of all
categories held in custody by the state just 30 years ago (before the
212tough-on-crime-movement) by 600 inmates. More importantly
210 JENNI GAINSBOROUGH & MARC MAUER, DIMINISrNG RETURNS: CRIME AND
INCARCERATION IN THE 1990s 27 (The Sentencing Project 2000).
211 See KY. DEP'T OF CORR., INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE BY CRIME TYPE ON JANUARY 1,
1989-2001, at http://www.corrections.ky.gov/Facts n Figures/profile.htm (last visited
Sept. 22, 2004); Ky. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE PROFILE JANUARY 2002, at http://
www.corrections.Ky.gov/Facts n Figures/profile 2002.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2004);
KY. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE PROFILE JANUARY 2003, at http://www.corrections.Ky.gov/
Facts_n_Figures/profile 2002.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2004) [hereinafter collectively
referred to as DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE PROFILES].
212 As shown by Figure 3 in Part III, supra, the total number of inmates in
Kentucky's prisons in the early 1970s ranged from 2838 in 1970 to 3120 in 1972, and
averaged for the first five years of the decade only 3015. See Dep't of Corr., Population
Projections, supra note 84.
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perhaps, the numbers in the chart show a growth in the incarceration of
drug offenders that paints an especially troublesome picture for the
future. The growth of drug inmates from 1242 to 3632 in only twelve
years (an increase of almost 2400 inmates) is staggering, and the rate of
growth for the period in comparison to growth rates for other major
categories of crime is no more comforting-almost 200% for drug
inmates in comparison to 59% for violent offenders2 13 and only 29% for
property crime offenders.2t 4 In these numbers, however staggering they
are, there is no mystery and no surprise, for they result directly from the
obsession with incarceration that has dominated Kentucky's war on
drugs.
Kentucky signaled fairly early a determination to use imprisonment
as the first and most important weapon against the drug epidemic. In the
late 1960s and early 1970s, the state had two initiatives for drug law
reform unfolding at the same time--one that was part of the state's
comprehensive criminal law reform effort (as recommended by drafters
of the state's new penal code)2 15 and one that was part of an initiative by
the Kentucky Department of Health to deal only with the state's drug
problems.2 16 The two initiatives culminated in the formulation of separate
recommendations for reform of the state's drug laws that arrived in the
hands of the General Assembly well in advance of its legislative session
for 1972. The fate of the two initiatives in the 1972 session sent a crystal
clear message as to how the General Assembly intended to attack the
drug problem.
The two sets of recommendations were highly similar in their overall
approaches to criminalizing illegal drug activities. They both
recommended a set of crimes to cover trafficking in drugs, that is,
activities related to commercial exploitation of the illegal drug market,
and a separate set of crimes to cover the possession of illegal drugs for
personal use. They both grouped illegal drugs into five schedules
according to their potential for abuse (and other factors), 2 17 and used
those schedules for purposes of distinguishing the more serious from the
213 The state held 5023 violent offenders in custody in 1992 and 8000 in 2003, an
increase of 2977, or fifty-nine percent. See DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE PROFILES, supra
note 211.
214 The state held 2648 property crime offenders in custody in 1992 and 3437 in
2003, an increase of 789, or twenty-nine percent. See id.
215 See PENAL CODE: FINAL DRAFT, supra note 24, at 287-300.
216 For a fuller discussion of these two initiatives, see Dale H. Farabee, The
Evolution of Drug Legislation in Kentucky, 61 Ky. L.J. 641 (1973).
217 The schedules relied upon for both sets of recommendations were derived from
schedules contained in an earlier enacted federal drug law that had been enacted in 1970.
See The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
95-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
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less serious offenses. 218 In modest respects, they both encouraged the use
of treatment and rehabilitation in lieu of imprisonment for offenders
convicted of possession for personal use.219 They were not carbon copies
of each other but were enough alike to have been drawn from the same
model, except for one crucial difference. The two were miles apart in
their recommendations on punishment of drug offenders.
The drafters of the new penal code recommended penalties for drug
crimes that were at the bottom end of the proposed penal code's penalty
structure. The penalties for possessing illegal drugs for personal use were
at the misdemeanor level (maximum of twelve months in jail) except for
possession of narcotic drugs listed in the two highest schedules
(Schedules I and II), which was punished as a class D felony (with a
penalty range of one to five years). 220 The penalties for trafficking in
illegal drugs were fixed at the misdemeanor level for the least dangerous
drugs (listed in Schedules IV and V), at the class D felony range for
more serious drugs (non-narcotic drugs listed in Schedules I and II), and
at the class C felony range (from five to ten years) for the most serious
drugs (narcotic drugs in Schedules I and II).221 The penalties for these
offenses were in line with penalties for other crimes in the proposed new
code and stopped far short of sending a message that the state was about
to wage a war on the drug epidemic.
The drafters of the second set of reform recommendations by the
Kentucky Department of Health set penalties for drug crimes that were
substantially identical to the penalties recommended by drafters of the
proposed penal code, and then proceeded to push those penalties literally
off the chart by recommending an enhancement provision for repeat
offenders. They ignored (or overlooked) the fact that penalty ranges
allow for harsher treatment of more serious offenders (such as those who
repeat earlier crimes) and recommended an across-the-board "two
strikes" law for drug offenders that doubled the potential penalties for
most drug offenses (elevating one to five ranges to five to ten, five to ten
ranges to ten to twenty). The proposal had the additional effect in some
instances of elevating misdemeanor penalties (maximum twelve months
218 The drugs most likely to produce criminal charges and conviction (such as
heroin, cocaine, LSD, and marijuana) were included in the two highest schedules
(Schedule I and Schedule II) while drugs with less potential for abuse (and more potential
for accepted medical use) were included in the other three schedules (Schedules III, IV,
and V). For a fuller description of the schedules and the drugs specifically included
therein, see Act of Mar. 25, 1972, ch. 226, §§ 5-14, 1972 Ky. Acts 942-49; PENAL CODE:
FINAL DRAFT, supra note 24, at 296-300.
219 See Act of Mar. 25, 1972, ch. 226, §§ 5-14, 1972 Ky. Acts 942-49; Farabee,
supra note 213, at 650-52.
220 PENAL CODE: FINAL DRAFT, supra note 24, §§ 2910-2911, at 291-93.
221 Id. §§ 2905-2907, at 289.
[VOL. 93
2004-2005] DIFFICULT TIMES IN KENTUCKY CORRECTIONS
in jail) to felony penalties (one to five years in prison). The "two strikes"
penalties were incredibly high in comparison to penalties for other
crimes in the proposed new penal code, and were surely calculated by the
sponsors of this legislation to announce in no uncertain terms that
toughness, rather than tolerance, is the correct response to the drug
problem.
The General Assembly concurred with this latter view, rejected the
more tolerant views and penalties of the proposed new penal code,222
enacted the above described "two strikes" law for drug offenses, 22' and
set out to fight the war on illegal drug use with very heavy reliance on
incarceration. In the more than three decades since this beginning, the
General Assembly has not retreated in the slightest from its aggressive
stance and, in fact, has become tougher on drug offenders. The "two
strikes" law remains intact, applies almost across the board (with the
exception of a second offense of marijuana possession 24), elevates some
misdemeanor offenses to felonies,22 5 doubles, or more than doubles, the
penalties for most felony drug crimes, 226 and continues to push penalties
in this area to very high levels both in the abstract and in relationship to
other crimes on the books. But there is much more to the toughness of
this law than is found in the "two strikes" provisions. In at least the
following ways, the General Assembly, with some important help from
the Kentucky Supreme Court, has heaped added misery on drug
offenders.
First, the legislature created the offense of selling controlled
substances to a minor and gave it the same penalties that are imposed on
the most serious of all drug offenses (trafficking in the first degree),
namely five to ten years in prison for a first offense and ten to twenty for
a repeat of the offense.22 7 The offense extends to all types of controlled
222 The 1972 General Assembly enacted the new penal code in 1972 (although
giving it a deferred effective date to July 1, 1974) without any provisions on drug crimes.
See Act of Mar. 27, 1972, ch. 385, 1972 Ky. Acts 1653-1783. The 1974 General
Assembly reenacted the new penal code again without any provisions on drug crimes. See
Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, 1974 Ky. Acts 831-889.
223 See Act of Mar. 25, 1972, ch. 226, 1972 Ky. Acts 938-966.
224 See K.R.S. § 218A.1422 (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
225 See, e.g, § 218A. 1414 (trafficking in controlled substances in third degree);
§ 218A.1416 (possession of controlled substances in second degree); § 218A.1417
(possession of controlled substances in third degree); § 218A.1421(2) (trafficking in
marijuana).
226 See, e.g., § 218A. 1412 (elevating first degree trafficking from a Class C felony to
a Class B felony); § 218A.1413 (elevating second degree trafficking from a Class D
felony to a Class C felony); § 218A. 1415 (elevating first degree possession from a Class
D felony to a Class C felony); § 218A.1421(3) (elevating trafficking in marijuana from a
Class D felony to a Class C felony).
227 § 218A.1401.
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substances (even those in Schedules IV and V), to any quantity of such a
substance (including small amounts of marijuana), and to any kind of
transfer (including transfers without consideration). Its coverage is
disconcerting to say the least. Should an eighteen-year-old give to a
seventeen-year-old friend a half joint of marijuana, the crime would be
committed and the penalty would be no less than five nor more than ten
years in prison, unless the transfer was a second drug offense in which
case the penalty would be no less than ten nor more than twenty years.
Should the eighteen-year-old have possessed a weapon at the time or
have an additional prior conviction for theft, the penalties would be even
more unconscionable, as described below.
Second, in the legislative act that created the offense described in the
preceding paragraph,228 the General Assembly also created the offense of
trafficking in a controlled substance within one thousand yards of a
school, classifying this as a D felony.229 At least in urban areas, the
requirement that trafficking occur within one thousand yards of a school
is largely cosmetic; because schools are so numerous in such areas, a
very high percentage of illegal drug sales will bring the offense into play.
The offense extends to all controlled substances (Schedules I through IV)
and therefore works to convert drug crimes that would normally be
classified as misdemeanors into felonies. 230 And because this offense and
the one described in the preceding paragraph each have an element not
required by the other,2 3' a sale of drugs to a minor within one thousand
yards of a school would support convictions of both crimes 232 and
potentially higher penalties as a result of court-ordered consecutive
service of sentences.
Third, the relationship between the repeat offender provisions of the
drug laws (the "two strikes" law) and the repeat offender provision of the
Penal Code (the persistent felony offender or "three strikes" law) can
have a dramatic effect on the penalties for drug offenders under certain
circumstances. The Kentucky Supreme Court has ruled that these statutes
operate independently of each other and thus can support a double
228 See Act of Apr. 13, 1992, ch. 441, § 21, 1992 Ky. Acts 1327.
2 1 See id. § 11, at 1325.
230 Specifically, it would elevate to felony status the misdemeanor crime of
trafficking in the third degree (which covers drugs in Schedules IV and V) and the
misdemeanor crime of trafficking in small quantities of marijuana. See K.R.S.
§§ 218A. 1414, 218A. 1421(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
231 One offense but not the other requires that the transaction involve a minor, and
one but not the other requires that the transaction occur within one thousand yards of a
school.
232 Overruling earlier, more restrictive controls over multiple convictions from a
single act, the Kentucky Supreme Court held in 1997 that a single criminal act can
support multiple convictions when there is in each charged crime an element not required
by the other. See Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1997).
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enhancement of penalties for a second drug offense,2 33 although it has
also ruled that a single prior conviction may not be used for both
234
enhancements. For instance, a defendant who is convicted of
trafficking in small amounts of marijuana (a misdemeanor punishable by
no more than twelve months in jail) could face enhancement on the basis
of a prior marijuana trafficking offense (elevating his status to that of a
class D felon with a penalty range of one to five years in prison), and a
second enhancement on the basis of a prior felony conviction for theft
(further elevating his status to that of a class C felon with a penalty range
of five to ten years). On the other hand, if the charged offense involved
sale to a minor (a class C felony in its own right), enhancement under the
drug laws for an earlier drug conviction would elevate the charged
offense to class B status (ten to twenty years in prison), and a second
enhancement for the prior theft would further elevate the charged offense
to class A status (not less than twenty nor more than fifty years or life
imprisonment).
Fourth, once again ignoring the fact that penalty ranges for drug and
other offenses allow greater penalties for more serious offenders, such as
those who possess firearms when committing crime, the General
Assembly acted in 1994 to add to Kentucky's drug laws yet another
enhancement provision.23' The provision elevates all drug offenses by
one level if committed while the offender was in possession of a
firearm, 236 meaning that offenses classified as misdemeanors are elevated
to class D felonies, offenses classified as class D felonies are elevated to
class C felonies, et cetera. The defining statute requires that the firearm
be possessed at the time of the offense (not that it be used in the offense),
and seems to permit the enhancement to occur alongside other
enhancements that are applicable to a given drug offense (e.g., the
persistent felony offender enhancement), although with respect to the
latter point the Kentucky Supreme Court has not yet so ruled.237
There is nothing in the content or history of these provisions (or in
some others of lesser importance 238) to indicate that they derive from
233 See Commonwealth v. Grimes, 698 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Ky. 1985) ("[A] conviction
of a second offense of trafficking in a Schedule III controlled substance under KRS
218A.990(2), may be further enhanced by a persistent felony offender second degree
charge;pursuant to the general PFO statute .... ).
For example, a prior drug conviction could not be used to enhance a drug
conviction under the drug laws and then be used again for an enhancement under the
persistent felony offender laws. See id.
235 Act ofApr. 11, 1994, ch. 396, § 5, 1994 Ky. Acts 1193.
236 See K.R.S. § 218A.992 (Banks Baldwin 2004).
237 See ROBERT G. LAWSON & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, KENTUCKY CRIMINAL LAW 633
(1998).
131 See, e.g., K.R.S. § 218A.1402 (providing higher penalties for criminal conspiracy
when the conspiracy is to commit the offense of trafficking in controlled substances); §
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some kind of carefully calculated effort to develop a rational penalty
structure for drug crimes. They were enacted one by one over a period of
about twenty-five years and appear to be related one to another only by a
common motive-a firm belief that the best way to control the drug
epidemic is to put more people in prison for longer periods of time. They
have put huge numbers of people in prison (as the data in Figure 8
shows), and beyond that have done nothing but raise serious doubts as to
whether incarceration is the ultimate solution to the drug problem. They
have generated some discussion about altematives to incarceration (e.g.,
drug courts, increased spending for treatment, etc.) but continue to
produce an ever-increasing flow of inmates for the prison system, an
exceedingly costly condition that cannot be rectified without a major




In 1984, Congress abandoned rehabilitation of offenders as a
significant goal of punishment, eliminated indeterminate sentencing, and
abandoned the idea of release on parole in the federal system.239 In 1994,
it pushed states in the same direction by providing billions of federal
dollars for construction of prisons on the condition that recipients require
violent offenders to serve no less than eighty-five percent of their
sentences of imprisonment (without credit for good time served). 240 In
1998, influenced by this law, the Kentucky General Assembly added to
the state's parole laws a provision providing that "a violent offender shall
not be released on probation or parole until he has served at least eighty-
five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.",241 It defined "violent
offender" to include all persons committing capital offenses, class A
felonies, class B felonies that involve death or serious physical injury to
a victim, and the crimes of rape and sodomy in the first degree.
242
218A. 1418 (providing for substantially greater penalties for the offense of theft when the
theft involves controlled substances); § 218A.1432 (providing for higher than normal
penalties for manufacturing and trafficking in methamphetamines).
239 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1988 (1984).
240 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-13709 (1994).
241 See Act of Apr. 14, 1998, ch. 606, § 77, 1998 Ky. Acts 3643 (codified at K.R.S.
§ 439.3401(3)).
242 K.R.S. § 439.3401(1).
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The effect of this provision is essentially to eliminate the possibility
of parole for a substantial group of offenses-all murders and first
degree manslaughters, 243 some but not all kidnappings,244 all assaults in
the first degree,245 all rapes and sodomies in the first degree, 246 burglaries
and robberies in the first degree where serious injury occurs, and arson
in the first degree.248 It has had no effect on the state's inmate population
problem to date, since very few if any of the offenders covered by the
provision would have qualified for parole release in the absence of the
provision. But in due course (a decade or so down the road), the
provision will have a tremendous impact on this problem by producing a
substantial and steady flow of prisoners with very long sentences that
must be served out. In addition to elevating the inmate population, the
provision will impose an extraordinary burden on the state's corrections
budget because of the unusual costs of caring for an older prison
population; "one report estimates that the cost of incarcerating a geriatric
prisoner is three times that of maintaining a regular inmate. 249
2. Limits on Probation
The 1974 Penal Code was enacted into law without a single
restriction on the authority of sentencing judges to use probation or
conditional discharge in lieu of imprisonment.2 5 0 Probation, of course,
was a crucial piece of the rehabilitation model of sentencing and an early
target of the tough-on--crime movement. In 1976, just one year after the
new penal code took effect, the General Assembly enacted its first and
probably most important prohibition against the use of probation in lieu
of imprisonment, categorically denying that alternative to persons
convicted of felonies involving the use of firearms (except for those
classified as class D felonies or certain domestic disputes).251 This same
legislation eliminated the possibility of probation or conditional
discharge for persons convicted of additional crimes committed while on
243 See §§ 507.020, 507.030.
244 See § 509.040.
141 See § 508.010.
246 See §§ 510.040, 510.070.247 See § 511.020.
24 8 
See § 513.020.
249 Vitiello, Three Strikes, supra note 181, at 437.
250 See K.R.S. § 533.010. As discussed earlier, the 1974 Code authorized judges to
grant probation in all cases (except where a death penalty was imposed) and strongly
encouraged its use by providing that it "shall be granted unless the court is of the opinion
that imprisonment is necessary for protection of the public." Id.
251 See Act of Mar. 19, 1976, ch. 180, § 2, 1976 Ky. Acts 426 (codified at K-R.S.
§ 533.060(1)).
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parole or probation for earlier crimes.252 From this beginning, the
General Assembly has curtailed the authority of courts to use probation
in lieu of imprisonment in a variety of ways:
One: Probation is statutorily denied to persons who commit a variety
of sexual offenses against youthful victims, including rape, sodomy,
prostitution, incest, using minors in sexual performances, and
others. z53 The defining statute fixes "criteria" for such a denial (so-
called aggravating circumstances), leaving little room for probation
after conviction of a qualifying offense. 25
4
Two: Repeat offenders are denied probation in most instances by the
persistent felony offender laws. 5 They may be considered for this
alternative only when all of their convictions (priors and present) are
for offenses classified as class D felonies that have not involved "a
violent act against a person.,
256
Three: Probation has also been categorically denied to offenders who
engage in crimes while armed with deadly weapons and wearing
body armor.
257
While the impact of these restrictions on the state's inmate population
problem is difficult if not impossible to measure, because some of the
offenders to whom the restrictions apply are not good candidates for
probation in any event, they are each designed to guarantee greater use of
imprisonment and undoubtedly have had that effect.
3. Concurrent and Consecutive Sentences
The 1974 Penal Code gave sentencing judges unrestricted discretion
to run multiple sentences concurrently, but gave them limited authority
to run multiple sentences consecutively. The code provided in the latter
situation that multiple sentences could not be accumulated to produce
imprisonment beyond the maximum that would have been produced by a
prosecution of the defendant under the persistent felony offender law for
the most serious of his or her crimes.258 The objectives were 1) to give
sentencing judges maximum flexibility in providing for the disposition of
offenders and 2) to provide some minimal protection against abusive and
irrational sentencing practices.
252 See id. (codified at K.R.S. § 533.060(2)).
253 See K.R.S. § 532.045.
254 See § 532.045(2).
255 See §§ 532.080(5), (7).
256 Id.
257 See § 533.065.
258 See Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 283, 1974 Ky. Acts 874 (codified at K.R.S.
§ 532.110).
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In one of its earliest efforts to get tougher on criminals, the General
Assembly modified both branches of the law on concurrent and
consecutive sentencing, and in so doing opened the door to substantially
harsher treatment of defendants facing sentences for multiple crimes. It
modified the persistent felony offender provision that had been used to
control consecutive sentencing259 and, perhaps without intending to do
so, lost much of the law's protection against abusive aggregation of
consecutive sentences for multiple offenses.260 It reduced the authority of
judges to use concurrent sentencing by prohibiting concurrent sentences
for felonies committed by offenders during periods of probation or
parole 26 and for all offenses committed by persons while awaiting trial
on other charges.262 These changes had the immediate effect of
producing longer sentences for repeat offenders, and a longer range
effect of producing higher levels of occupancy in the state's prison
facilities. 63
4. Others
It is next to impossible to describe all of the ways in which the
General Assembly has contributed to the state's inmate population by
toughening provisions of the 1974 Penal Code. It has created new crimes
for which it has fixed unusually high penalties,2 4 has regularly
259 See supra Part IV.B for a full discussion of changes in the persistent felony
offender law.
260 Decisions construing the applicable statute seem to suggest that there remains
little protection against consecutive aggregation of sentences. See, e.g., Violett v.
Commonwealth, 907 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1995) (affirming an aggregate sentence of 754
years); Hampton v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1984) (finding no fault with a
sentence of 105 years); Devore v. Commonwealth, 662 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. 1984)
(sustaining an aggregate sentence of eighty years generated by consecutive sentencing for
relatively minor crimes).
261 See Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 180, § 2, 1976 Ky. Acts 426 (codified at K.R.S.
§ 533.060(2)).
262 See id. (codified at K.R.S. § 533.060(3)).
263 In later legislation, the General Assembly added modestly to these effects by
prohibiting the use of concurrent sentences when one of the sentences was being imposed
for commission of either escape or attempted escape. See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 405,
§ 3, 1982 Ky. Acts 1371 (codified at K.R.S. § 532.110(3)).
264 The following are illustrative: In 1978, the General Assembly created the new
offense of engaging in organized crime and fixed its penalty range at ten to twenty years
in prison. See Act of Mar. 30, 1978, ch. 321, § 1, 1978 Ky. Acts 920 (codified at K.R.S.
§ 506.120). In that same year, it created the offense of using minors in sexual
performances, setting the penalty range at five to ten years for offenses involving any
minor, and at ten to twenty years for offenses involving a minor under sixteen, and at
twenty to life if any physical injury occurred to the minor. See id. Act of Mar. 30, 1978,
ch. 321, §3, 1978 Ky. Acts 920. In 1982, it created the offense of criminal abuse and
fixed penalties for this offense that in some instances have a penalty range of five to ten
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265toughened penalties on existing crimes, and on more occasions than
can be mentioned has taken action to convert misdemeanors into
felonies.266 It has also used the "two strikes" and "three strikes" concepts
in several areas to raise relatively minor crimes from misdemeanors to
267felonies. None of these toughening measures on its own has added
significantly to the state's inmate population. However, there is no room
to doubt the extent to which they have cumulatively affected the flow of
prisoners into the state's corrections system, especially those provisions
that converted misdemeanors into felonies and brought into the state's
prison population relatively minor offenders who would have been
incarcerated in local jails without the conversions.
V. LOOKING AHEAD
A. Inmate and Cost Projections
Since 1980, the number of citizens held in custody in Kentucky has
increased every year except one. 268 The inmate population increased
almost 450% from 1970 to 2000 and stood at 17,330 prisoners in 2003.269
The laws, policies, and sentencing practices that produced these results
years in prison, which is much higher than the penalties for assault and wanton
endangerment that had earlier covered the conduct. See Act of Mar. 31, 1982, ch. 168,
§§ 1-4, 1982 Ky. Acts. 412.
265 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 9, 1982, ch. 56, §§ 2-3, 1982 Ky. Acts 89 (elevating
second-degree arson from a Class C to a Class B felony and first-degree arson from a
Class B to a Class A felony); Act of Feb. 28, 1992, ch. 16, §1, 1992 Ky. Acts 26
(elevating tampering with public records from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class D
felony).
266 The following are illustrative: In 1976, the General Assembly elevated the crime
of nonsupport from misdemeanor to felony by creating a new offense called flagrant
nonsupport. See Act of Mar. 30, 1976, ch. 361, § 1, 1976 Ky. Acts 744 (codified at
K.R.S. § 530.050(2)). In 1982, it elevated certain assaults and even attempted assaults
from misdemeanors to felonies when the victim happens to be a peace officer, and since
that time has done the same for certain assaults and attempted assaults when the victim
happens to be either an employee of a detention facility or certain social workers. See Act
of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 429, § 1, 1982 Ky. Acts 1442 (codified at K.R.S. § 508.025). In
1984, the General Assembly elevated custodial interference from misdemeanor to felony
by eliminating special treatment earlier given to defendants who interfered with legal
custody of their own relatives (e.g., parent interfering with custody of own child). See Act
of Mar. 9, 1984, ch. 79, § 1, 1984 Ky. Acts 113 (codified at K.R.S. § 509.070).
267 See, e.g., K.R.S. § 510.015 (elevating minor sex crimes such as sexual
misconduct to felonies upon the commission of a third offense); id. § 514.100 (elevating
the crime of unauthorized use of automobiles from misdemeanor to felony upon
commission of a second offense).
268 See Dep't of Corr., Population Projections, supra note 84.
269 id.
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are still intact and still delivering to the corrections system an ever-
increasing number of inmates for incarceration in the state's prisons and
jails. The Department of Corrections recently reported current and
historical figures on new commitments from the court system, clearly
indicating that the state's inmate flood is not even close to a crest-3088
new inmates in 1989, 5167 in 1995, and 7511 in 2003 (an increase of
almost 150% from the beginning to the end of this period).270 In light of
these critical numbers (and especially the trend), it is no surprise that the
projections on inmate populations (as charted in Figure 9 below) show a
corrections system continuing to reel in convicted felons at
unprecedented rates:
Figure 9
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The ramifications of the projections are far-reaching to say the very
least, especially the prediction that the corrections system will hold 4350
more inmates in 2010 than it held at the end of 2003. This increase of
more than twenty-five percent is astonishing in such a brief period of
time. If perspective is needed, it might be remembered that it took the
270 See KY. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMISSIONS & RELEASES-FREQUENCY OF INCOMING
ACTIONS, at http://www.corrections.ky.gov/Facts-nFigures/admissions.htm (last
updated Sept. 21, 2004) [hereinafter DEP'T OF CORR., ADMISSIONS & RELEASES].
271 See Dep't of Corr., Population Projections, supra note 84.
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state almost two full, centuries to reach a grand total of 3000 inmates in
its prison facilities.
272
Cost projections for elevated levels of inmate populations are harder
to estimate and find, although no one can reasonably doubt that
incarceration comes at a very heavy cost under the best of circumstances.
The state reported in 2003 that the annual cost of incarcerating a single
inmate had reached an average of $17,193 (and was substantially more
than that average in some institutions), 273 and in that same year reported
a total corrections budget of more than $310 million.274 These numbers
suggest that the corrections budget is quickly headed toward $400
million, not counting funds that will be needed for construction of new
facilities. The state will need the equivalent of one new prison every
biennium for the housing of 4350 new inmates by 2010 (unless it
chooses to house huge numbers in local jails), at a projected cost of $100




The tougher laws and tougher attitudes described above do more
than generate greater numbers of inmates for incarceration. They push
the corrections system to the limits of its capacity, create a need to find
room for new commitments, and ultimately produce very high numbers
of inmates for release back into the community. Too little consideration
has been given to the latter of these numbers and to the fact that tough-
on-crime policies and practices have produced for most corrections
systems a kind of revolving door-relatively short periods of
incarceration for huge numbers of citizens, release and supervision
within the community, and all too often a return to custody for violation
of release conditions. Facts and figures leave no room to doubt the
existence of such a phenomenon in the Kentucky system.
The state has kept and reported data on flows of inmates into and out
of prison facilities for at least fifteen years.276 The raw numbers have
272 See id.
273 Dep't of Corr., Cost to Incarcerate, supra note 132.
274 Dep't of Corr., Appropriations History, supra note 92.
275 The agency responsible for state construction projects recently reported that the
state's most recent prison construction (the facility in Elliott County) cost $123,000,000.
See Capital Planning Board, Improvements Plan, supra note 134. The agency made the
following statement about future costs: "[T]he DOC is also proposing design of another
new medium security facility in 2006-08 at a cost of $6,560,000. The actual construction,
as proposed for 2008-10, has a cost of $91,950,000 and an anticipated completion in FY
2010/11 ." Id.
276 See DEP'T OF CORR., ADMISSIONS & RELEASES, supra note 270.
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more than doubled during the reporting period, as one would expect in
light of the total population growth that has occurred, and the figures at
both the entry and exit ends of the cycle are staggering in comparison to
historical standards and truly extraordinary by any measurement:
Figure 10
Inmate Admissions, Years 1989-2003
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Figure 11
Inmate Releases Years 1989-2003
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There is much to be seen in these numbers: 1) the obvious correlation
between admissions and releases; 2) an indication from that correlation
that prison capacity plays a pivotal role; and 3) a growth rate, especially
in admissions, that is disconcerting, if not outright scary, to corrections
authorities. But above all else is the remarkable picture of more than
10,000 people entering and leaving the state's prison facilities in a single
year, a massive rotation of inmates into and out of the system that could
cause even hard-core tough-on-crime advocates to wonder if the net
effects of such incarceration might be more negative than positive.
Incarceration incapacitates offenders, and hopefully deters them
from committing additional crimes. The extent to which it serves the first
of these penal objectives is diminished by the never-ending need to find
room for new commitments from the court system, as evidenced by the
fact that a typical Kentucky inmate will serve no more than fifteen
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months or so before being released back into the community.277 The
extent to which it serves the second of these objectives is unclear, as
indicated by the fact that a substantial portion of the offenders released
from custody find themselves returned to custody within two years.278
Whether or not there is enough in these two benefits to justify the levels
of incarceration described above (more than 10,000 citizens rotating into
prison for periods of about 15 months) is anything but certain, once
account is fairly taken of the damaging and destructive effects of
imprisonment.
Incarceration disrupts every aspect of an offender's life, and in return
offers tiny contributions toward a successful reintegration of that
offender back into the community as a law-abiding citizen. The prison
environment is perpetually overcrowded, dominated by aggressive
behavior and resulting fear, a breeding ground for racial tension and
strife, and totally destructive to the many who arrive there with serious
mental and emotional shortcomings. The prison population, it is to be
remembered, consists of moral deviants and not model citizens, and is far
more capable of providing instruction on the commission of crime than
on the worth and qualities of good citizenship. The following statement
about the potential effects of imprisonment on drug offenders is almost
surely applicable to the full spectrum of inmates:
Unfortunately, prison may also provide low-level drug offenders an
education in "advanced drug-trafficking." These offenders, embittered
by the system, develop relationships with high-level offenders. "The
overuse of incarceration may strengthen the links between street and
prison, and help cement users' and dealers' identity as members of an
operational drug culture, while simultaneously shutting them off from
277 The Department of Corrections has charted the time actually served by inmates
for at least fifteen years and shows in its charts that typical offenders served about a year
in prison in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and presently serve slightly more than fifteen
months before being released from custody. See KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, TIME SERVED, at http://www.corrections.ky.govfFacts-nFigures/time
served.htm. (Feb. 5, 2004).
278 For example, 27.5% of all inmates released from custody in year 1999-2000
returned to prison within the first two years of their release. See Dep't of Corr.,
Recidivism, supra note 14. In earlier years, the recidivism rate was substantially higher-
34.7% in 1994, 33.1% in 1995, and 34.2% in 1996. See id. Some authorities report much
higher rates of recidivism: "More than half a million people will leave America's prisons
and jails this year, beginning a difficult transition that many will fail. Sixty-two percent
of them are expected to be arrested at least once within the next three years, and 41
percent to wind up back in jail or prison." MARTA NELSON & JENNIFER TRONE, STATE
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS PROGRAM: WHY PLANNING FOR RELEASE MATTERS 1
(Vera Inst. of Justice 2000).
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the prospect of successfully participating in the economy outside the
prison when they get out.",
279
The prison setting is designed to change attitudes, but is at least as
conducive to negative as to positive change. It is more likely to enhance
than to diminish the mental, emotional, and social deterioration of
inmates, and even under the best of circumstances offers no more than an
even chance of correcting the situation and conditions that led to
incarceration in the first place.
C. Nonessential Programs
Corrections systems are rarely capable these days of providing more
than a small part of what inmates need for a successful return to their
communities. Certainly that is so with respect to the Kentucky system, in
no small measure because of an annual inmate flood that has now
reached 10,000. Huge numbers of inmates commit crimes under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, arrive in the corrections system in need of
treatment, and return to their communities months or years later in
280exactly the same condition. Corrections professionals were brutally
honest in a recent assessment of the problem:
Testimony presented by Justice Cabinet officials to [the Capital
Planning Advisory Board] on July 31 indicated that... 60 percent of
the felon population, both incarcerated and supervised, meet the clinical
definition for substance dependency. Less than 20 percent of the
incarcerated population that is in need of treatment receives it, and less
than 10 percent of the supervised population receives needed treatment
281
Incarceration may offer a unique opportunity for addressing substance
abuse problems,282 but drug treatment is a nonessential program that has
no chance to flourish in periods of tight budgets and extraordinary
inmate flows. Inmates have to be fed, clothed, housed, given minimal
medical care, and guarded; they don't have to be given substance abuse
treatment. Thus, without some reduction in inmate flows and a
279 Spencer, supra note 201, at 370-71 (citations omitted).
280 Capital Planning Board, Improvements Plan, supra note 134.
281 Id. (emphasis added).
282 "Overall, drug-involved offenders who receive a full complement of treatment
and aftercare in a correctional setting are three times more likely to remain drug-free and
arrest-free than those who receive no treatment at all. With this comes reduced crime,
safer communities, and reduced costs for police activity, court processing, and
incarceration." Inciardi, supra note 204, at 287.
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reallocation of resources from incarceration costs to drug treatment, no
one should expect corrections professionals to prepare inmates for a
drug-free and crime-free life on the streets.
Drug treatment is not the only needed but nonessential corrections
program likely to suffer under the strain of bloated prison populations.
Most of the 10,000 who entered the state's prison facilities in 2003 were
poorly educated, poorly trained, unemployed or underemployed, and
unprepared for even the most basic of challenges in the work place.
Corrections programs aimed at these deficiencies qualify as the best
experiences offered during incarceration. However, they have never been
adequately funded, and in more recent times have been under even
greater budgetary stress (both in Kentucky 83 and elsewhere284 ). Even
under the best of circumstances, such programs offer no certain solution
to the huge and in many instances insurmountable obstacles to successful
reentries into the work force. The following statement on the subject is
totally unsurprising:
Research has yet to reveal the precise effects of incarceration on future
employment, although several studies show that former inmates have
more difficulty than other people finding and keeping a job. While
neither the federal government nor most states track the number of
inmates employed after release, the few available statistics continue to
reveal high rates of joblessness among this group. In New York, for
example, sixty percent of former prisoners were unemployed last year,
down just slightly from ... [sixty-five] percent six years ago.285
Most inmates enter prison from "hard to employ" categories
(because of low educational achievement and poor work experience) and
283 Tentative actions to slash education and training programs in the corrections
budget drew substantial media attention during 2003 budget considerations and even
some objection from inmates: "The program that offers prisoners classes in basic
academic skills and trades, like masonry, plumbing and carpentry has been cut from the
state budgets passed by both the House and the Senate. I am scared to death, and I'm
angry," [inmate Ronald] Huggins said. "If you take this away from me, what will I do?"
Karla Ward, Budget Cuts Would End Most Prison Education; What Will Convicts Do
Without Training?, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 2, 2003, at AI; see also Keeling,
supra note 8 (noting that, after budget cuts, "[f]elons will be back on the streets earlier
... but will be less likely to have received any education in prison except the kind of
education that enhances their criminal behavior").
284 "The third way many state corrections departments are reacting to budget
pressures is by cutting so-called nonessential programs. These cuts primarily have
affected educational, substance-abuse treatment, and vocational programs." WILHELM &
TURNER, supra note 22, at 3.
285 NELSON & TRONE, supra note 278, at 2.
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are more likely than not to leave in the same category, although now
more handicapped than ever by the fact that they search for work as
persons who served time in prison ("ex-convicts"). Some, perhaps most,
are destined for second-class citizenship and the difficulties that
invariably accompany such a status-underemployment or un-
employment, inadequate housing or homelessness, resurrection of old
habits and old relationships, and very high risks of recidivism. Nothing
less than an all out war on this problem (and a huge infusion of
additional resources) has any chance of changing this reality; and no
such war will ever be waged so long as the state remains obsessed with
incarceration policies and practices that generate an ever-expanding
prison population and rob corrections managers of all but the faintest
hope of assisting inmates in a successful return to their communities.
D. Parole and Parole Services
The idea behind the concept of parole is that appropriate punishment
cannot be fixed at the time of sentencing since it "depends considerably
on an offender's response to conditions of imprisonment and on his
perceived capacity to refrain from criminal acts at the time he is to be
released.",286 The retention of this idea and of parole as a crucial
component of the criminal justice system ranks as one of the really
important decisions made in Kentucky during the tough-on--crime
movement, one that is now being rapidly undermined by an inmate
population that has pushed the parole caseload completely off the charts.
Without some relief from inmate flows that have now reached
stratospheric levels (see Figures 10 and I I above), parole is destined to
become less of a process for determining proper punishments and more
of a relief valve for a prison population that always exceeds capacity.
The Parole Board is obligated by law to fix parole eligibility
requirements28 7 and to provide hearings for inmates who meet those
requirements. 288 The effect of the state's inmate population explosion on
the Board and on the parole process is indicated by a set of numbers
showing the tremendous growth in hearings required of the Board to
meet the second of these obligations (as charted in Figure 12 below):
286 MODEL PENAL CODE arts. 6 & 7 introductory cmt. at 4 (1985).
287 See K.R.S. § 439.340(3) (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
288 See § 439.340(2).
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Source: Annual Reports of Parole Board
The Board had five full-time members in 1972,289 and conducted 2395
hearings. In 2002, the Board had seven full-time and two part-time
members290 and conducted 11,490 hearings, little more than a fifty
percent increase in decision makers but a 380% increase in the number of
hearings held. The caseload per member (which by raw numbers now
exceeds 1500 for every full-time member) is made even worse by a
requirement that hearings be held before Board panels of three
members 29 ' and a further requirement that decisions be either unanimous
or reviewed and reconsidered by panels consisting of four members.292 A
decision granting or denying parole is no less important than the
sentencing decision made at trial, and no less difficult. It deserves to be
deliberate and calculated rather than routine and hurried. These decisions
are jeopardized when conditions produce caseloads that number in the
thousands rather than the hundreds and exceed by a wide margin
anything that could be described as reasonable. The Board is asked to do
the impossible, another legacy of the tough-on-crime movement that
continues to produce more prisoners than the state can possibly
accommodate.
The policies and practices that have overwhelmed the Parole Board
have had the same effect on parole services. The number of offenders
doing their time on the streets is larger than it has ever been and heading
higher while the number of parole officers in the system has failed
miserably to keep pace, producing for parole officer caseloads that are
several times what they were before the prison population explosion and
far in excess of levels that would give inmates the kind of assistance they
289 See Act of Mar. 27, 1972, ch. 291, § 1, 1972 Ky. Acts 1352-54.
290 See K.R.S. § 439.320(1).
291 See § 439.320(4)(a).
292 See § 439.320(4)(b).
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need for reconnection to their communities after incarceration. Many if
not most newly released inmates need intensive, time-consuming help
with very difficult problems (housing, family issues, drug and substance
abuse, employment, and others) and many if not most parole officers are
stretched too thin to provide that help, conditions that are blamed for a
return of huge numbers of inmates to prison to resume their
incarceration.293 Parole services is another nonessential program (like
drug treatment and job training) that has fallen prey to the inmate
population explosion, although its costs are modest in comparison to the
costs of incarceration 294 and its crucial importance to a successful
reintegration of inmates into their communities is undeniable.295
E. State Inmates in Local Jails
The state's escalating reliance on local jails for the incarceration of
state inmates easily ranks as the most questionable decision of the tough-
on-crime movement, although some might say that it does not deserve to
be called a "decision" since it came into being without any consideration
of policy implications for the justice system and solely because the state
had more inmates that it could house in its own facilities. The state
reported in 2003 that it had more than 5000 state inmates in local jails,296
and has since reported that it has such inmates housed in seventy-one
different jail facilities.297 These inmates are all serving indeterminate
terms of imprisonment (for as long as ten years) in physical facilities that
were once thought to be suitable only for inmates serving fixed terms of
imprisonment of substantially shorter duration (no more than one year
and typically much less). The raw numbers are enough to create
nightmares for corrections officials and professionals-5000 inmates for
whom the state is constitutionally responsible scattered across the
landscape in seventy-one different facilities for which it is not
responsible.
293 The Department of Corrections reports on its webpage that it admitted more than
1800 inmates to prison for parole violations in 2003, more than 1700 in 2002, more than
1600 in 2001 and more than 1400 in 2000. See DEP'T OF CORR., ADMISSIONS &
RELEASES, supra note 270.
294 The Department of Corrections reported in 2003 that the cost to incarcerate
inmates averaged $17,193 per inmate and much more in some institutions, while the cost
of maintaining offenders on probation and parole average $1255 per inmate. See Dep't of
Corr., Cost to Incarcerate, supra note 132.
295 See NELSON & TRONE, supra note 278, at 2 (describing the difficulties inmates
face upon seeking a job after their release and the corresponding importance of
vocational training); Schiraldi & Greene, supra note 129, at 332.
296 Dep't of Corr., Felons in Jails, supra note 87.
297 KY. DEP'T OF CORR., LOCAL FACILITIES, at http://www.corrections.ky.gov/
LocFac.htm.
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Incarceration in these facilities could be expected to vary from place
to place and inmate to inmate, although published data concerning the
nature of such incarceration is not plentiful. Some inmates are permitted
to leave the facilities periodically to perform community service work,
while others are denied the privilege out of concern for public safety.298
Although better than confinement in tight and sometimes overcrowded
quarters, the service work does not add significantly to the employment
skills needed by inmates for reentry into their communities. It is
extremely difficult to provide helpful programs for inmates in a few
well-staffed state prisons, and it is virtually impossible to duplicate that
feat in a large number of facilities (in this instance seventy-one) that are
not well-staffed and that are designed to serve primarily as places of
confinement above all else. The state's jail program had no objective
other than confinement in the beginning and has no realistic objective
other than confinement today, a condition that is rendered especially
unfortunate by the fact that the state's jail population is probably far
more susceptible to rehabilitation than the state's prison population, since
it includes most of the state's nonviolent and drug offenders.
In 1988, when considering the constitutionality of imprisoning state
inmates in local jails, the Kentucky Supreme Court made a statement
about then-existing conditions that still rings true today:
The Corrections Cabinet concedes there are certain facilities available
within the state penal system which are not available in county jails:
recreation, education, work opportunities, and rehabilitation programs.
Some county jails make efforts in this direction, but these efforts are far
short of the programs available in state facilities. 299
The court stopped short of saying that local confinement had to be
duplicative of state confinement in order to meet constitutional
requirements (although such a statement was made in a concurring
opinion300 ), but stated very clearly that the state remains responsible for
such confinement and that such confinement must "meet minimum
standards for the care of state prisoners." 30' If this means local
confinement that is roughly equivalent to state confinement, the jail
program is clearly vulnerable to constitutional challenge, for there can be
no doubt that the state cannot provide programs in local jails (especially
... See K.R.S. § 441.125 (Banks-Baldwin 2004) (defining the rules for community
service work).
299 Campbell County v. Kentucky Corr. Cabinet, 762 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Ky. 1988).
300 "The prisoners involved do not have a right to be incarcerated in a specific state
penal building but rather, I believe they have only a right to be imprisoned in the
equivalent of a state penal institution." Id. at 17 (Wintersheimer, J., concurring).
3"' Id. at 15.
[VOL. 93
2004-2005] DIFFICULT TIMES IN KENTUCKY CORRECTIONS
all seventy-one local jails) that are equivalent to the programs it provides
to inmates in state prison facilities (even under the stress of tight
budgets). The simple truth is that the state's jail program is a
confinement program and little else. It is a warehousing of inmates that
reflects a total abandonment of any efforts to facilitate the ultimate return
of offenders to the streets as law-abiding citizens.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The tough-on-crime movement promised relief from high crime
rates, unsafe streets and communities, and a drug epidemic. It has
produced twenty-five years of explosive growth in the nation's prison
population and a rate of incarceration that is disgraceful in comparison to
the rates of other countries. It has lost some of its steam (mostly because
of its enormous cost) but very few of the tougher laws, policies, and
practices that it engendered. Whether or not it has delivered on its
promises of lower crime rates and safer streets remains open for debate,
although comprehensive studies and highly respected authorities raise
serious doubts:
Finally, there is the one 1970s argument-that tougher penalties will
reduce crime rates-that is still heard, but mostly from campaigning
conservative politicians and virtually never from crime-control
researchers or from authoritative nonpartisan bodies. Political scientist
James Q. Wilson, for example, for two decades America's leading
conservative scholar of crime and punishment, in 1994 acknowledged,
"Many (probably most) criminologists think we use prison too much
and at too great cost and that this excessive use has had little beneficial
effect on the crime rate."
No one doubts that having some penalties is better than having
none. What is widely doubted is the proposition that changes in
penalties have any significant effect on behavior. Most crime-control
scholars are doubtful because that proposition is refuted by the clear
weight of research evidence and because every nonpartisan expert body
in the United States, Canada, and England that has examined the
evidence has reached the same conclusion. In 1993, the National
Academy of Sciences Panel on Understanding and Control of Violent
Behavior ... noted that the average prison time per violent crime had
tripled between 1975 and 1989 and asked, "What effect has increasing
the prison population had on levels of violent crime?" The answer,
"Apparently, very little."
Similar bodies in other English-speaking countries have reached
the same conclusion. The English Home Office ... conducted a three-
year review of evidence on the crime-control effects of penalties and
concluded that the penalties' effects were so uncertain that they
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should have only minor influence on sentencing policy ....
In 1993, the judiciary committee of Canada's parliament
recommended that Canada shift from an American-style law
enforcement approach to crime to a European-style preventive
approach. The report observed, "The United States affords a glaring
example of the limited impact that criminal justice responses may have
on crime .... If locking up those who violate the law contributed to
safer societies then the United States should be the safest country in the
world." There is overwhelming additional evidence to support the
conclusions of the government sponsored panels in Canada, England,
and the United States . 3 2
In the face of such doubts and the huge economic costs of mass
incarceration, it is not extravagant to expect law and policy makers to
engage in some new thinking about the human costs of imprisonment (to
which we have been blinded by our recent obsession with incarceration),
and about the real impact on crime of rotating thousands of citizens into
and out of a prison system that is at least as likely to cultivate criminal
behavior as law-abiding citizenship.
It is not hard upon reflection to see how we have created the mess we
have in corrections in this state and elsewhere. We have chosen to punish
offenders rather than to try to convert them into better citizens, to
incarcerate them for extended periods rather than to run some risk that
they might commit additional crimes if left in or returned to their
communities, and to invest resources in the construction of prisons rather
than in programs that are designed to reduce the need for prisons. We
have demonized criminals in mass, have lost sight of the importance of
distinguishing between dangerous offenders who must be imprisoned for
protection of the public and nondangerous offenders who might be
required to pay their debts to society in other ways, and have laid a
foundation for a new citizen underclass made up of parolees, ex-
302 TONRY, SENTENCING MATrERS, supra note 23, at 7-9 (citations omitted); see also
Spencer, supra note 201, at 381: "As the preceding sections indicate, federal statutes
prescribe increasingly harsh penalties for drug offenders.... Despite the severity of these
new laws, however, drug crimes continue and policy makers demand more severe
penalties.... The response to more drug crimes is more incarceration, and the response
to more incarceration is more crime. The cycle is closed; we ignore all alternatives and no
one questions the practice of using imprisonment to solve the drug problem." Id.; Beres
& Griffith, Deterrence, supra note 172, at 59 ("Unfortunately, studies of the impact of
actual changes in criminal or law enforcement methods suggest that it is difficult to
change the behavior of potential offenders. Most research has found that increasing either
the severity of punishment or the certainty of apprehension has only a modest deterrent
effect.").
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convicts, and their families. We have acted under a belief that no price is
too high to pay for protecting the public from crime and have generated
incarceration costs that now consume huge proportions of corrections
budgets, all to the detriment of programs that corrections professionals
know to be crucial to any hope of converting offenders into law-abiding
citizens. And, most fundamentally perhaps, we have abandoned the
notion that imprisonment should be the last rather than the first response
to the commission of crime, and in so doing we have opened the door to
the mass incarceration of citizens that we have experienced.
Where to go from here is not as easy to see. There is some renewed
interest in alternatives to imprisonment and some visible signs that the
tide may have turned against irrational reliance on incarceration.
Corrections professionals have urged lawmakers to look for alternatives
to imprisonment. °3 The Kentucky Supreme Court has taken some
initiative to do just that through the adoption of a drug court program
specifically designed to empty some prison cells now occupied by drug
offenders.3 °4 Lawmakers have put in place some innovative alternatives
to imprisonment (home incarceration, community service, electronic
monitoring, monetary penalties and restitution, and others), while
retaining the most important of the traditional alternatives (probation and
parole, halfway houses, mandatory drug treatment, etc.). But the
incarceration numbers (especially the trends and projections) remain
ominous to say the least and leave no doubt that meaningful reform has
yet to take root.
With the politics of crime still tilting strongly toward tougher laws
and tougher attitudes toward criminals, it will not be easy for lawmakers
to embrace the reforms that are needed to slow the flow of inmates that
has flooded the prison system and put the state's corrections budget at
risk of bankruptcy. It would be unrealistic to expect a sudden and
wholesale retreat from a twenty-five year obsession with incarceration
but not to expect some reform of laws and policies that are now very
widely viewed as symptomatic of the worst of all excesses of the tough-
on-crime movement. The most obvious excesses of the tough-on-crime
movement in Kentucky are the state's law on persistent felony offenders
(the so-called "three-strikes" law) and the provisions that have created
for Kentucky a totally irrational penalty structure for drug crimes. A
move to eliminate these excesses would lay the cornerstone for some
meaningful reduction in the prison population, would free up some
303 See e.g., Capital Planning Board, Improvements Plan, supra note 134
(recommending that the legislature identify and implement new alternatives to
incarceration, and improve treatment options for inmates).
304 See Kentucky Court of Justice, Drug Court, at http://www.kycourts.net/AOC/
DrugCourt/AOCDrugCourt text.shtm (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
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resources for enhancement of programs directed at rehabilitation of
offenders, and would begin to restore some needed balance between the
seriousness of crimes and the punishments that are inflicted upon
offenders. More importantly perhaps, it would begin to sound a
necessary warning that there are limits beyond which the state should not
and will not go in its efforts to protect the public against the commission
of crime.
